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CONQUEST AND SLAVERY AS FOUNDATIONAL TO PROPERTY LAW  
 K-Sue Park*  
This article demonstrates that the histories of conquest and slavement are 
foundational to U.S. property law. Over centuries, laws and legal institutions 
facilitated the production of the two commodities, or forms of property, upon 
which the colonial economy and the United States came to depend above all 
others: enclosures of Native nations’ land and enslaved people. By describing 
the role of property law in creating markets for lands and people, this article 
addresses the gap between the marginal place of these histories in the contem-
porary property law canon and the growing scholarly and popular recognition 
that conquest and enslavement were primary modes of property formation in 
American history.  
First, this article describes how the field of property law has come to omit 
these histories from its common understanding of what is basic to its subject by 
examining property law casebooks published over 130 years. For most of their 
history, it shows, such casebooks affirmed the racial logic of conquest and slav-
ery and contributed to these histories’ suppression in pedagogical materials. 
Early treatises avowed the foundational nature of conquest, but after the first 
property law casebook appeared, at the time of the close of the frontier, case-
books for more than half a century emphasized English inheritance, rather than 
acknowledging colonization’s formative impact on the property system. In the 
same period, the era of Jim Crow, casebooks continued to include many cases 
involving the illegal, obsolete form of property in enslaved people; when they 
ceased to do so, they replaced them with cases on racially restrictive covenants 
upholding segregation. After several decades, during which the histories of 
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conquest and slavery were wholly erased, casebooks in the 1970s began to ex-
amine these histories through a critical lens for the first time. However, the 
project of understanding their consequences for the property system has re-
mained only partial and highly inconsistent.     
The central part of this article focuses on the acquisition of property, 
which, properly understood, comprises the histories of conquest, slavery, ex-
propriation, and property creation in America. It examines the three main theo-
ries of acquisition—discovery, labor and possession-- beginning with the 
United States’ adoption of the Discovery Doctrine, the international law of con-
quest, as the legal basis of its sovereignty and property laws. In this context, it 
shows that the operative principle of the doctrine was not that of first-in-time, 
as commonly taught, but the agreement of European nations on a global racial 
hierarchy. Second, it turns to the labor theory, which was selectively applied 
according to the hierarchy of discovery, and firmly linked ideologies about 
non-whites and property value. It then reframes the labor theory’s central ques-
tion—property creation—as a matter of legal and institutional innovation, ra-
ther than merely agricultural labor. It examines the correlation between histor-
ical production of property value in the colonies to show how the main elements 
of the Angloamerican land system developed through the dispossession of 
nonwhites-- the rectangular survey, the comprehensive title registry, headrights 
and the homesteading principle, laws that racialized the condition of enslave-
ment to create property in human beings, and easy mortgage foreclosure, which 
facilitated the trade of human beings and land as chattel to increase colonists’ 
wealth. Third, it assesses how the state organized the tremendous force re-
quired to subvert others’ possession of their lands and selves, using the exam-
ples of the strategy of conquest by settlement and the freedom quests that gave 
rise to the fugitive slave controversy. Its analysis highlights the state’s delega-
tion of violence and dispossession to private actors invested in the racial hier-
archy of property through the use of incentives structured by law.  
This article concludes by summarizing how the laws that governed con-
quest and slavery established property laws, practices, and institutions that laid 
the groundwork for transformations to interests in land after the abolition of 
slavery, which I will address in a future companion article. This article aims 
throughout to offer a framework for integrating the study of English doctrines 
regulating relations between neighbors-- the traditional focus of a property law 
course—into an exploration of the unique fruits of the colonial experiment -- 
the singular American land system that underpins its real estate market and its 
structural reliance on racial violence to produce value.  
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For nearly two and a half centuries, conquest and enslavement were pri-
mary modes of creating property in America. Beginning in the early seven-
teenth century, English colonists up and down the eastern seaboard grew their 
market in enslaved people to support their growing occupation of Native Na-
tions’ lands. By the eve of the Revolution, property in land enclosures and hu-
man beings comprised approximately 75% of all of American colonists’ 
wealth.1 After its establishment, the United States continued to accumulate 
property in lands and people as it extended its jurisdiction to its current borders 
and the Pacific. Without understanding how this history of property production 
shaped the structure, dynamics, and regulation of the property law and institu-
tions that underpin the U.S. real estate market, it is impossible to explain two of 
its most familiar and notable aspects today: its racial disparities and capacity for 
proliferating monetary interests from land.2  
Yet despite the impact that the processes of conquest and enslavement had 
on the development of property practices and law in America, little to none of 
these histories now constitutes a regular part of the property law canon. This ar-
ticle addresses this conundrum and offers a framework for closing that gap. 
First, using casebooks as a proxy for what property law scholars have under-
stood to be the essential elements and frameworks of the subject, it describes 
the patterns of erasure of these histories from the field. It then shows how these 
histories nevertheless underpin the architecture of the curriculum today, in 
keeping with the ways that early scholars affirmed conquest and slavery as the 
basis of the subject. When we explicitly examine these histories, I argue, they 
illuminate how the system evolved to produce its profits and crises in the pre-
sent, in ways that we can ill-afford to ignore.  
 
1 ALICE HANSON JONES, WEALTH OF A NATION TO BE: AMERICAN COLONIES ON THE EVE 
OF THE REVOLUTION 95-98 (1980).  
2 Approximately $51 trillion in base assets and $15 trillion in investment assets.  




Indeed, the histories of conquest and slavery help clarify the relationship 
between discrete topics in the property law course and the unique systemic as-
pects of U.S. property law that anchor its real estate market today. For genera-
tions of students in first-year property law classes, the absence of such a frame 
has meant that the course has had the tendency to feel like a grab-bag of topics. 
Before I taught Property Law for the first time, several people told me that de-
signing the course was like assembling a train: you choose topics like cars that 
you string together as you please. But casebook authors reincorporated materi-
als touching on the histories of conquest and slavery to their materials relatively 
recently, as I show below; many who teach the subject are not trained in these 
histories, and it is not surprising that these topics frequently appear to be op-
tional cars of second-order importance -- less essential than, for example, units 
on estates, servitudes, adverse possession, or nuisance. It remains common to 
omit these topics, or if any of them appear, they do so as a add-ons-- at best, an-
other car in the property law train. However, when well-meaning instructors 
present such topics as aberrations, or primarily to castigate a regrettable chapter 
of the past, they reinforce the idea that racial violence in property is the result 
of individual prejudice infecting an essentially neutral system.  
This article argues that the histories of conquest and slavery present more 
than an opportunity for apology or condemnation, or addenda to the traditional 
doctrines. Rather, they comprise the train’s track, and are essential to explain-
ing what American property is and how it has been constructed by law. In order 
to better understand how we have arrived at our present conception of property, 
Part I examines property law casebooks from the late nineteenth century to the 
present. For over 130 years, the casebook has served as an engine of knowledge 
production, as well as for the explicit propagation of ideas about what we know 
about property from one generation to the next. The casebook, most simply, 
represents an ongoing effort by preeminent scholars to summate the founda-
tional elements of a field— to identify its most important frameworks, repre-
sentative doctrines, illustrative cases, and what constitutes essential background 
for understanding its development. This evolving set of choices indexes the 
ways that we have constructed, framed, and justified law, as well as how a 
changing society affects this intellectual development.  
The study of American property law casebooks below shows that conquest 
and slavery were once affirmed as central to the field, but that casebook authors 
erased them over time, and have yet to uniformly take serious stock of their im-
plications for the field. At a time coincident with the formal close of the fron-
tier, the first property law casebooks set aside a robust treatise tradition of cele-
brating conquest, to create a lasting trend of focusing, instead, on the English 
feudal land system. By contrast, early casebooks offered illustrative cases in-
volving the obsolete and illegal form of property in enslaved people, as well as 
other cases affirming the legality of segregation, until nearly the end of the pe-
riod of Jim Crow. By the mid-1940s, however, the history of slavery had been 
wholly suppressed, with the history of conquest. It was not until the 1970s that 
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casebooks attempted to reintroduce material about either. Now, casebooks ubiq-
uitously, if marginally, address the foundation of U.S. sovereignty in conquest, 
but never uniformly embraced a confrontation with the history of slavery; treat-
ment of both subjects remains relatively rare and inconsistent.  
As a result of these erasures and path-dependent development, the Ameri-
can property law curriculum focuses almost exclusively on English doctrines 
regulating relations between neighbors, rather than the unique fruits of the colo-
nial experiment -- the American land system that underpins the real estate mar-
ket and its structural reliance on racial violence to produce value. Part II offers 
an account of the genesis of the field through the histories of conquest3 and 
slavery and a sketch of what we lose from the framework of property law as it 
has evolved. It revisits the three main theories of acquisition in property—dis-
covery, labor, and possession-- beginning, in Part IIA, with the Discovery Doc-
trine and the United States’ inheritance of European extractive missions to 
claim the bodies, lands, and resources of non-Christian non-Europeans. I show 
that in Marshall’s affirmation of the law of conquest as the basis for U.S. sover-
eignty and property—and thus jurisdiction-- the principle of first-in-time was 
subsidiary to the principle of hierarchy, which placed European claims above 
others. Part IIB examines Locke’s labor theory to consider the ideology it drew 
from and helped propagate, which selectively applied the theory according to 
the hierarchy of discovery, as well as the process of property creation in colo-
nial America. Properly understood, I argue, the story of property creation is the 
story of the creation of property institutions and law: English colonists labored 
to expropriate lands and render them property in ways structured by law, giving 
rise to what may be the American property system’s most distinctive features—
chains of title rooted in Native title, the rectangular survey, the comprehensive 
title registry, and easy mortgage foreclosure. They also cultivated a labor force 
by creating another major form of property in people, with laws that made the 
condition of enslavement racial, hereditary, and perpetual. Part IIC addresses 
the way the state organized the tremendous force required to subvert others’ 
possession of their lands and bodies in the context of colonization and enslave-
ment. It examines two examples-- the expropriation of lands by settlement and 
the fugitive slave controversy-- to highlight how the state harnessed the energy 
of private interests to enact the violence necessary to maintain its property sys-
tem and the racial order upon which it was built. 
In sum, the omission of the histories of conquest and slavery from our study 
of property obstructs our ability to recognize many crucial aspects of the field’s 
systemic aspects—its role in establishing jurisdictions at every level, the mech-
anisms that make property interests in land liquid, the correlation between prop-
 
3 This article’s analysis focuses on the colonial period and extends into the early Republic, 
but conquest continued throughout the nineteenth century and remains ongoing. See also 
Joseph Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & Possession to Democ-
racy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L. J. 763, 768 (2011). 




erty value and racial presence, and its reliance on private interests to meet pub-
lic goals.4 Yet these aspects of property law are likely the most intuitive points 
of entry to the subject in a world of rapidly changing urban environments, ris-
ing rents, racial segregation, and homelessness across the country. Public un-
derstanding that conquest and slavery are central to the history of property in 
America is growing, too, making the legal academic conception of property law 
increasingly anomalous. Moreover, these histories have grown one of the larg-
est markets in the world: U.S. real estate is worth approximately $51 trillion to-
day,5 the American land system on which it is based now underpins the global 
speculative real state market as well.6 As it continues to produce inequity with 
wealth, around the world as well as within the nation’s borders, it is more ur-
gent than ever to understand the dynamics and costs of this system’s reliance on 
racial violence and dispossession to produce value. This article recounts how 
that reliance developed historically as well as how it fell outside the framework 
of property law, even as it continues to work across the landscape in plain sight. 
I. HISTORICAL ERASURE IN PROPERTY LAW CASEBOOKS  
To teach about the histories of conquest and slavery in the first-year prop-
erty law course requires addressing the void left by a history of erasure. The 
pattern of how these histories appeared and did not in property law casebooks, 
beginning with the first, published by Harvard Law Professor John Chipman 
Gray in 1888, correlate to changing waves of national historical consciousness 
over the last 130 years. Early casebooks appeared at a moment of great ideolog-
ical ferment, in the context of the formal close of the frontier and the ascend-
ance of Jim Crow. Elite legal scholars’ efforts to summarize the outlines, his-
tory, and key principles of property law capture the trajectory of shifting 
imaginations of the field, as well as of the nation and its past. In general, case-
books have followed the current of ideologies that furthered histories of racial 
violence, more than they have contributed to helping us understand their role in 
shaping property law in the United States.  
As I show below, for nearly a century, casebooks suppressed the law of 
conquest, though it remained “good law” on the books, while for nearly half a 
 
4 As Singer warns, “We need to rewrite our history books so that our children understand 
the actual process by which we acquired title to lands in the United States.” Id. at 773. 
5 Interests in land today constitute about 60% of global mainstream assets. Financial Ac-
counts Guide: Derivation of U.S. Net Wealth, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/displaytable.aspx?t=b.1.  
6 A wide literature on global land titling programs, influenced strongly by Hernando De 
Soto, argues that an American style property system is key to building national wealth. 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).  
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century, they liberally incorporated cases involving the illegal, obsolete form of 
property in enslaved people. As this section shows, in a departure from legal 
treatise traditions, early property law casebooks eschewed the history of coloni-
zation in America to focus on English feudal law as the basis for property law 
instead. As a result, their primary focus today remains English doctrines regu-
lating relations between neighbors. Meanwhile, when casebooks finally dis-
pensed with slavery cases in the 1940s, they replaced them with another genre 
of cases affirming racial segregation—those upholding racially restrictive cove-
nants. After the Supreme Court struck down such covenants, casebooks had lit-
tle choice but to confront this law. Casebooks did not really begin to confront 
the histories of conquest and slavery until the 1970s, after the movements of the 
1960s. Consequently, the history of conquest now appears marginally but con-
sistently in the standard materials for the property law course. By contrast, a 
few casebooks address the history of slavery, but most do not, and it remains 
highly variable whether these topics are taught at all and to what purpose.  
It is important to note that there are many possible measures by which one 
might characterize the scope of casebooks’ erasure, including what a wider lit-
erature and set of perspectives would contribute to our understanding of the his-
tories of conquest and slavery in relation to American property law. For the pre-
sent purpose, my analysis is confined to the narrow and simple metric of what 
content the canon once held and what it now contains. That is, I focus on the 
path leading to casebooks’ incorporation of the materials that typically provide 
fodder for classroom discussion of these histories at the present time, namely: 
1) the monumental 1823 John Marshall decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh, which 
affirmed conquest as the root of U.S. sovereign and private title; and 2) the 
presence of an independent section, however brief, about the American slave 
trade, and the infamous Roger Taney opinion Dred Scott v. Sandford, which re-
jected the idea that descendants of enslaved Africans could be rights-bearing 
citizens of the United States.  
A.  The Erasure of Conquest 
Nearly every property law casebook in circulation today recognizes the 
fundamental status of the 1823 John Marshall decision Johnson v. M’Intosh to 
the subject. The case, which remains current law and clearly identifies conquest 
as the root of title to land in the United States, also appeared frequently in nine-
teenth century treatises. As Stuart Banner writes, it “quickly assumed a promi-
nent place in them, as the authoritative statement of the foundations of Ameri-
can property law” and “became part of the canon of celebrated cases that all 
learned lawyers knew.”7 In his overview of U.S. jurisprudence, James Kent 
 
7 STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE 
FRONTIER 188 (2009). 




drew on Johnson to explain how Congress came to have “a large and magnifi-
cent portion of territory under their absolute control and disposal”: “[t]he title 
of the European nations, and which passed to the United States, to this immense 
territorial empire, was founded on discovery and conquest.”8 Joseph Story also 
opened his venerated 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, which he dedi-
cated to Marshall, with a summary of Johnson’s  explanation of conquest as the 
origin of sovereign title and territory in the United States.9 As Kent elaborated, 
the case was essential for understanding “the history and grounds of the claims 
of the European governments, and of the United States, to the lands on this con-
tinent, and to dominion over the Indian tribes.”10  
Nonetheless, Johnson v. M’Intosh did not appear in Gray’s seminal case-
book, nor in property law casebooks thereafter until 1960. Instead, Gray framed 
American property law primarily in terms of its descent from the English feudal 
system,11 rebuffing a great American preoccupation with the history of con-
quest and the disposition of the public lands. His introduction to the law of real 
property focuses on aspects of the English system that perhaps distinguish it 
most from its American offshoot: it devotes twenty-eight pages, for example, to 
topics such as the manor, military tenure, socage tenure, and tenancy in frankal-
moign, which are at best marginally relevant to the American system.12 Gray’s 
historical account of the property system’s evolution through public land law in 
England devotes a mere two paragraphs to “Tenure in the United States,” which 
consist of a dubious claim that colonies were held as English manors, and a 
long excerpt from an 1859 N.Y. appellate decision stating American colonial 
property law was more feudal than England’s own.13  
This focus on English law sharply contrasts with other well-established un-
derstandings of property and American legal development at that time. Story, 
 
8 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 257 (1832).  
9 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2–8 
at 4–7 (Cambridge, Little and Brown 1851). 
10 Kent, supra note 8. See also K-Sue Park, This Land is Not Our Land, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1977, 1996 (also citing 1 JOSEPH KINNICUT ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF 
PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 41 (Harrison Gray 
1826); 10 TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 33, 147 (Little, Brown 
1895); JOSEPH KINNICUT ANGELL AND JOHN WILDER MAY, A TREATISE ON THE 
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY 416–17 (Little, 
Brown 1869). 
11 1 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY (Cambridge, University Press 1888).  
12 Id. at 385-407. 
13 Van Renssalaer v. Hays 19 N.Y. 68 (1859) (concerning rent in arrears). The case is repre-
sentative insofar as it was a common nineteenth-century practice to cite to English authori-
ties.  
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for example, explained his choice to begin his Commentaries with Johnson’s 
summary of the history of conquest by the fact that it would be “impossible to 
fully understand [the Constitution’s] nature and objects” if we neglected “a 
careful review of the origin… and juridical history of all the colonies.”14 In con-
trast to Gray’s suggestion that American property law was a  mere transplant 
from England, Story emphasized that “[t]races of these [colonial] peculiarities 
are every where discernable in the actual jurisprudence of each State.”15 Where 
Gray’s introduction to real property comprises a description of the English sys-
tem, wherein “all the land in the kingdom is supposed to be holden, mediately 
or immediately, of the king, who is styled, the lord paramount, or above all,”16 
Story acknowledged an American relationship to property unimaginable in 
England when he wrote that “there has never been in this country a dependent 
peasantry. The yeomanry are absolute owners of the soil.”17 An 1864 property 
law treatise by Emory Washburn, too, suggested that feudal tenure was never 
transferred to nor claimed by the states. He cited an American Jurist writer who 
bluntly stated, of the Northwestern Territory, “the doctrines of tenure do not 
here exist even in theory”18; and Washburn further explained that “[i]t is un-
doubtedly true… that many of the principles of our law of real estate… were 
borrowed originally from the feudal system… But it is apprehended that the 
adoption of forms of process borrowed from a once existing system of laws, 
does not necessarily imply that that system has not become obsolete.”19  
Neither prior authority nor the historical record, as I show in Part II of this 
article, explain Gray’s insistence on English inheritance so well as ascendant 
ideological tendencies of the time. In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau declared 
the frontier formally closed-- on the basis that there was no longer land within 
U.S. territorial boundaries occupied by fewer than two white people per square 
mile. Many American intellectuals were eager to move past the colonial experi-
ence to place the U.S. on an equal footing with European nations. Gray’s case-
book epitomizes an impulse to align U.S. legal and political systems with Euro-
pean traditions that his contemporary Frederick Jackson Turner famously 
critiqued in his landmark essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History.”  Against the trend of emphasizing European derivation, Turner wrote 
 
14 Story, supra note 9.  
15 Id. at 1 (“our domestic institutions and policy… have grown out of transactions of a much 
earlier date, connected on one side with the common dependence of all the Colonies upon 
the British empire, and on the other with the particular charters of government and internal 
legislation which belonged to each Colony.”). 
16 Id. at 385. 
17 Id. at 160. 
18 2 EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 42-43 (Boston, Little 
and Brown 1864). 
19 Id. at 43-44.  




that “the peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been 
compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the 
changes involved in… winning a wilderness...”20 The American frontier, he ar-
gued, was utterly distinct from European borders because it was characterized 
by movement, the promise of “free land,” 21 and constituted “the meeting point 
between savagery and civilization.”22 He identified this failure to attend to 
westward expansion as a loss for scholarly, institutional understanding; writers 
who wrote about the frontier had mythologized the “border warfare and the 
chase,” he bemoaned, but not seriously studied the significance of territorial ex-
pansion for America’s economy and history.23   
This failure has been a loss for the study of law as well.24 For generations 
after Gray, casebooks largely ignored the impact of over 260 years of endoge-
nous legal development in the colonies and the early Republic, encompassing 
the creation of the survey system, title registry system, easy foreclosure of 
lands, and more.25 To the extent that they offered an account of the system’s 
historical evolution, they focused on English feudal law, producing incongruous 
and sometimes mystifying texts as casebooks began, no doubt for practical rea-
sons, to incorporate more American cases.26 It remained common to recite 
Gray’s suggestion that colonists had merely imported English property law to 
 
20 FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 2 (1921).  
21 Many scholars have discussed the euphemistic metaphor of “virgin land” for genocide. 
See HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 
(1970). For an account of the removal aspect, see K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1878 (2019). Turner also erases, if not the history of westward expansion, 
race from the Census Bureau definition: writes that “In the census reports [the frontier] is 
treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square 
mile.” Turner, supra note 20, at 3. 
22  Turner, supra note 20, at 3.  
23 Id. 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 See below, Part IIB. Gray’s first two books address the ancient English distinction be-
tween real and personal property, citing the thirteenth-century jurist Henry de Bracton and 
cases almost exclusively from 17th-19th century English courts—King’s Bench, Exchequer, 
Common Bench, Queen’s Bench, Chancery-- and one case from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania. The first case in the volume, Aubin v. Daly, however, concerns annuities 
granted for surrender of colonial interests in Barbados and the Leeward Islands to the 
Crown. Gray, supra note 11, at 2.  
26 With exceptions—see generally RALPH WILLIAM AIGLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER INTER VIVIOS (all 
eds., 1916, 1932, 1942); RALPH WILLIAM AIGLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY (all eds., 1951, 1960). 
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America27; where the term “conquest” appeared, it referred to William of Nor-
mandy’s eleventh century conquest,28 not English settlers’ occupation of Amer-
ica. Nonetheless, cases in these books also referred to specifically American 
phenomena, such as “lots” and “blocks” of tracts and the iconic 160 acre quar-
ter section of the U.S. survey system, and even annuities granted for surrender 
of colonial interests in Barbados and the Leeward Islands to the Crown, which 
went without explanation. In the 1930s, for example, University of Michigan 
Professor Ralph Aigler noted in passing that “[t]he practice of recording or reg-
istering instruments of title, while general in the states of the United States, is 
followed only in portions of England,” without explanation of the reason or sig-
nificance of this difference; he then discussed at length a statute of Anne appli-
cable only in the county of Middlesex, England.29 
In short, Johnson and the history of conquest were largely shut out of prop-
erty law casebooks for decades.30 One exception during this period illustrates 
that property treatises did not follow casebooks in this respect:  Homer Dibell’s 
1920 casebook drew on property law treatises, including Washburn’s and an-
other by Alfred Gandy Reeves, which described U.S. title as rooted in conquest, 
cited Story, and reviewed the history of the federal survey and disposition of 
the public lands.31 Dibell, a Minnesota state Supreme Court Justice, diligently 
 
27 See, e.g., ARTHUR MARTIN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
CONVEYANCES 17 (1939), (“It is generally assumed that the colonists brought with them as 
much of the common law and statute law of England as was suitable to their new circum-
stances in this country”; “The extent to which these English forms and theories of convey-
ance have been a part of our law is a matter on which there is some diversity of opinion.”). 
28 WILLIAM WALSH, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 203-07 (1906); 
WILLIAM WALSH, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY REAL AND PERSONAL 243-246 
(1922); Martin, supra note 27, at 1-5; WILLIAM WALSH AND RUSSELL DENISON NILES, 
CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 52-58 (1939); HARRY BIGELOW AND SHELDON TEFFT, 
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 497-99 (1941); RALPH AIGLER, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTIES 225-27 (1942); 
HARRY BIGELOW, CASES AND MATERIALS ON RIGHTS IN LAND 1-19 (1945); JOHN BLAKE, 
CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1-6 (1948); HOWARD WILLIAMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 56-91 (1954); ALFRED GANDY REEVES, A TREATISE 
ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1904). 
29 RALPH WILLIAM AIGLER, CASES ON THE LAW OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY, ACQUIRED 
ORIGINALLY AND TRANSFERRED INTER VIVIOS 844-46 (1932). The section on Title Regis-
tration, for example, an indisputably American innovation, is a rare section not presented 
through history, but rather, practical instructions for navigating the system. Where he men-
tions the Torrens system, Aigler admits it was developed to colonize Australia, but strains 
to argue that many European countries were doing the same. Id. at 979-83.  
30 One casebook excerpted a case, Barnett v Barnett, 117 Md 265, 83 A. 160 (1912), that 
briefly cited Johnson for the proposition that title was absolute. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 37 (1914).  
31 ALFRED GANDY REEVES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1405-14 (1914). 




described the history of Minnesota lands, some of which Great Britain ceded in 
the Treaty of Paris and some of which the United States acquired through the 
Louisiana Purchase. He acknowledged that “portions of the lands ceded were 
occupied by Indian tribes after the Indian fashion,” briefly described the federal 
structure of Indian law, and summarized the issue of Indian Occupancy, com-
menting that “in theory at least the government respect their rights of occu-
pancy.”32 It was not until 1960 that University of Illinois College of Law Dean 
John E. Cribbet followed Dibell’s example by opening his casebook with a 
straightforward recitation of the root of U.S. title in government grants, “the 
earliest of [which] were made by European governments seeking to colonize 
the New World.”33 In a footnote to this history, Cribbet and his co-author Cor-
win Johnson made the first substantive reference to Johnson to appear in a case-
book, in a description of recent Supreme Court cases that relied on Johnson as 
good authority to detrimental effect.34  
In 1974, in the wake of massive social movements across the country, 
Charles Donahue incorporated Johnson, along with the sit-in cases, into the text 
of an American property law casebook for the very first time.35 In 1978, Rich-
ard Chused followed and placed Johnson in a lengthy, groundbreaking section 
on conquest and federal Indian law.36 After Joseph Singer published a casebook 
including Johnson in the early 1990s that remains the standard for teaching 
about conquest and race in property law,37 the trend was set. Johnson v. M’In-
tosh now appears in every property law casebook, although teaching notes dif-
fer widely in terms of providing information about the case’s content and his-
torical significance. Despite the inclusion of Johnson, as Singer, has written, 
“Amazingly, some property casebooks fail to mention Indians at all. Most prop-
erty casebooks treat conquest as unfortunate but past,” or arrange material “as if 
to show that we have moved beyond barbarism to civilization.”38 Professors 
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, John Sprankling, and Jerry Anderson and 
Daniel Bogart all omit a basic historical description of the role the Discovery 
 
32 HOMER BLISS DIBELL, CASES ON REAL PROPERTY 3-4 (1920).  
33 JOHN E. CRIBBET, WILLIAM F. FRITZ, AND CORWIN W. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON PROPERTY 24 n.2 (1960) (citing Johnson in a footnote for its holding that some tradi-
tional rules of property were inapplicable to the “savage[ ]” Natives).  
34 U.S. v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks 329 U.S. 40 (1946); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
States 348 U.S. 272 (1955).  
35 CHARLES DONAHUE, THOMAS KAUPER, PETER MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION (1974). 
36 RICHARD CHUSED, A MODERN APPROACH TO PROPERTY (1978). 
37 JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW, RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1289-1308 (1993).  
38 Singer, supra note 3, at 766-767. 
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Doctrine played in European conquest more generally and British conquest spe-
cifically, despite Justice Marshall’s clear explanations in the case. Instead, Mer-
rill and Smith describe its operative principle as the right of the first-in-time,39 
and Anderson and Bogart focus on the principle of certainty.40 In other words, 
these authors extract purely ahistorical lessons from a case whose content is 
comprises a history of conquest and which also constitutes a landmark in that 
history itself.   
B. The Erasure of Slavery 
The arc of the erasure of the history of slavery follows a different pattern 
from that of the erasure of conquest from property law casebooks over time. 
Slavery appears as a ubiquitous property issue during the early period, as con-
quest appeared ubiquitously in treatises. By contrast, early property law case-
books included cases about slavery without reflection, critique, or even ac-
knowledgment that property in people was by that time illegal and obsolete. 
During the era of Jim Crow, casebooks never described the history of slavery; 
they neither explained the significance, scale, or impact of the trade, nor the na-
ture of the subjugation in these cases. Rather, they presented cases involving 
property in enslaved persons as natural; and as the number of these cases dwin-
dled significantly in the 1930s, and by the late 1940s, disappeared, they re-
placed them with a new genre of cases affirming racial hierarchy and segrega-
tion—cases upholding racially restrictive covenants. This law soon fell, but 
without occasioning clear reflection on the law of race and property. Casebooks 
did not confront the history of slavery and the impact of its abolition on U.S. 
property law until the 1970s. They never did so widely or uniformly, and it re-
mains exceptional to do so to this day.  
The use of cases illustrating white entitlements to subordinate and control 
Black people in order to teach property law was an aspect of the legal culture of 
Jim Crow. To put the emergence of modern legal education in context, property 
in enslaved people had been obsolete and illegal for more than twenty years 
when Gray’s casebook first appeared. Between that time and the abolition of 
slavery, federal troops had withdrawn from the South, allowing the white su-
premacist so-called “Redemption” movement to destroy Reconstruction; the 
Supreme Court had held that emancipation had no effect on debts or contracts 
for “slave consideration,”41 and struck decisive blows to efforts to extend civil 
 
39 THOMAS MERRILL AND HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 97-101, 
119-20 (2017).  
40 JERRY L. ANDERSON AND DANIEL B. BOGART, PROERTY LAW: PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, 
AND PERSPECTIVES 17-27 (2nd ed. 2019).  
41 See, e.g., White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872); Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 654 (1872); Boyce v. Tabb, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 546 (1873). See generally, Andrew 
 




rights and equal protection under law to Black people with decisions like U.S. 
v. Cruikshank in 1876 and the Civil Rights Cases in 1883.42 In the 1890s, 
through the turn of the century, the Court refused to intervene when southern 
states intensified their efforts to disenfranchise Black people;43 the federal gov-
ernment sanctioned de jure segregation, the diminution of educational opportu-
nities for Black people, and their legal and extralegal execution at the hands of 
whites.44 During the same period, Ida B. Wells launched her national anti-
lynching campaign, and the number of practicing Black attorneys was on the 
rise, prompting new obstacles to bar admission. The first Black lawyer, Macon 
Bolling Allen, was admitted to the Maine bar in 1844, but black attorneys “first 
appeared in significant numbers” in the post-Civil War South45; in 1890, there 
were 431 Black lawyers in the country; almost 60% resided in formerly Con-
federate states.46 These changes ushered in modern legal culture as we know it: 
Wisconsin instituted a written bar exam in 1865, followed by Virginia in 
189647; law schools proliferated, many of which were for whites only, and the 
casebook tradition was born.  
As a result, between 1870 and 1910, the overall number of lawyers in the 
country grew by 181% to a whopping 114,704 in 1910, but the number of 
Black lawyers among them was only 798.48 In the Property Law classrooms of 
the burgeoning number of law schools, students read cases that presented white 
ownership of Black people as part of the natural order. All but two property law 
casebooks published between 1888 and 1915 that I examined contained cases 
 
Kull, The Enforceability After Emancipation of Debts Contracted for the Purchase of 
Slaves 70 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 493, 504-6 (1994); John C. Williams, Slave Contracts and the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1009 (2016). 
42 U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
43 RICHARD M. VALLELY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
ENFRANCHISEMENT, 132, 139 (2004); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895). 
44 Vallely, supra note 43, at 139, 146; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); ERIC 
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988). 
45 J. Gordon Hylton’s work combing through Census records reveals a “handful” of others 
joined Allen before the Civil War, including in Louisiana while slavery was still in force. In 
1869, the year Howard Law School opened, George Lewis Ruffin became the first Black 
man to graduate from Harvard Law, and eventually, the first Black judge in Massachusetts. 
J. Gordon Hylton, The African-American Lawyer, the First Generation: Virginia as a Case 
Study, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 107 (1994); see also J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE 
MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 (1993). 
46 Hylton, supra note 45, at 108. 
47 Michael Marshall, Jim Crow Constitution Stifled Virginia’s Black Lawyers, U. VA. SCH. 
L.: NEWS & MEDIA (Oct. 13, 2003), https://www.law.vir-
ginia.edu/news/2003_fall/hylton.htm 
48 Hylton, supra note 45, at 110-11. 
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either directly involving property in enslaved people or citing such cases.49 
These cases often involved questions of devise and inheritance, and illustrated 
lessons concerning statutes of limitation,50 conversion,51 replevin,52 trover,53 
detinue,54 trespass,55 adverse possession,56 gift and delivery,57 ejectment,58 
 
49 Gray, supra note 11; WILLIAM SULLIVAN PATTEE, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN REALTY 
(1896); CHRISTOPHER GUSTAVUS TIEDEMAN, SELECTED CASES ON REAL PROPERTY: 
SELECTED AND ARRANGED FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AUTHOR'S TREATISE ON 
REAL PROPERTY (1897); ELMER E. BARRETT, CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
(1898); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND (1898); 
JASPER C. GATES, CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1898); GRANT NEWELL, 
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, WITH LEADING AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
(1902); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND (1904); 
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
(1904); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY (1906); WILLIAM F. WALSH, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
(1906); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND (1912); 
Burdick, supra n. 30; EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON 
THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1915); 1919: HENRY A. BIGELOW, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY; RIGHTS IN LAND (1919); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND (1919); EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER 
AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1919). Cf. JOHN ROOD, DECISIONS, STATUTES 
AND CASES CONCERNING THE LAW OF ESTATES IN LAND (1909); RALPH WILLIAM AIGLER, 
TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY, ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER INTER VIVOS 
(1916). 
50 Brent v. Chapman, 9 U.S. (1 Cranch) 358 (1809); Bryan v. Weems, 29 Ala. 423 (1856). 
51 Harvey v. Epes, 12 Va. (1 Gratt.) 153 (1855) (people hired to work on a certain portion of 
a railroad were taken to another portion, where they died from the work).  
52 Fitch v. Newberry, Doug. (1843) (citing a lawsuit where the Plaintiff provided medicines 
to a person enslaved by the Defendant without Defendant’s knowledge); Woodson v. 
Pearce, 27 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 416 (1858) (slave owner sought recovery of property in several 
people, including a woman named Caroline). 
53 Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 H. & J. 211 (1821) (slave owner sought to recover the value of 
property in children named Sall, Patt, and Phillis). 
54 Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala. 216 (1850) (slave owner sought recovery of property in two 
people claimed by parol gift from his uncle). 
55 Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N.C. 63 (1871) (slave owner sought damages for loss of turpentine 
and injury to enslaved persons). 
56 Chapin v. Freeland, 142 Mass. 383 (1886) (citing numerous lawsuits for the recovery of 
enslaved persons). 
57 McWillie v. Van Vacter, 35 Miss. 428 (1858) (citing case about title to person set up 
through parol gift requiring delivery of possession). 
58 Allen v. Mansfield, 108 Mo. 343 (1892) (a formerly enslaved person claimed parol gift of 
the lot on which she resided); Ewing v. Shannahan, 20 S.W. 1065 (1892) (citing a case in 
which the guardian of minor children purchased people with the money of his wards). 




standing,59 partition,60 community property,61 and charitable trusts.62 The broad 
variety of doctrines upon which these cases turned accords with Justin Simard’s 
recent observation that “the law of slavery” included not only the laws govern-
ing the status, escape, punishment, and emancipation of enslaved people-- a cat-
egory of laws now technically obsolete-- but the full variety of cases and doc-
trines comprising ordinary commercial law.63 These cases also give us a 
glimpse of how the lives of enslaved people were impacted by their enslavers’ 
health, indebtedness, and preferences between their children, and lawsuits 
brought by enslavers’ squabbling family members and neighbors. In some 
cases, the disputes concerned the events through which they lost their lives, as 
with one woman who remains unnamed in an action for conversion, who died 
after being hired out for housework and then being forced to work in the 
fields.64  
An exceptional few casebooks during this period included cases that pro-
vided a perspectives on the legacy of slavery, the challenges Black people faced 
in acquiring and protecting their property rights, and even abolitionist senti-
ment. In 1898, for example, William Sullivan Pattee used the 1892 case Allen v. 
Mansfield65 to illustrate the rule that an adverse possessor can acquire title only 
to that quantity of land she actually occupies. In this case, a woman named Ma-
linda claimed a lot upon which she resided with her children in “a small house 
or shanty” enclosed by a fence by parol gift from her deceased enslaver; the 
court noted that “the evidence ends to show that she dug a well and planted 
some trees in the inclosed part, and that she, for a time at least, had a small pig-
pen on the unenclosed part.” Her former enslaver’s family nonetheless sold the 
lot to a third party, who paid taxes on the lot and eventually sued to eject her. 
Though the lower court awarded Malinda title to the whole lot, on appeal, she 
was estopped from asserting title to the unenclosed part.  
In 1914, William Burdick devoted an unusual 49 pages of his casebook to 
the entirety of a 1867 case that considered whether a charitable trust created for 
 
59 Campbell v. Stakes 2 Wend. 137 (1828) (citing Bloss v. Holman for the proposition that 
an enslaved person had no standing before the law). 
60 Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636, 655 (1839) (citing case “passing incidental stock” of 
people, cattle, and “implements”). 
61 De Blane v. Lynch 23 Tex. 25 (1859) (concerning crops made by the labor of persons be-
longing to a married woman on land she owned). 
62 Jackson v. Phillips, 19 Mass. 539 (14 Allen) (1867) (discussing whether a trust created to 
further abolition is still may continue its activities after abolition).  
63 Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79, 87-88 (2020). 
64 Hooks v. Smith, 18 Ala. 338 (1850) (defendant “was clearly liable for her value”); see 
also Harvey, 12 Va. (1 Gratt.) at 153. 
65 Allen v. Mansfield, 108 Mo. 343 (1892). 
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abolitionist advocacy retained a valid charitable purpose after abolition. In 
Jackson v. Phillips, Justice Gray of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts used his opinion to review the history of the English slave trade and the 
history of slavery in Massachusetts, as well as the history of the law of charita-
ble trusts. Toward the conclusion of that lengthy exposition, the judge stated 
plainly that “[n]either the immediate purpose of the testator—the moral educa-
tion of the people; nor his ultimate object—to better the condition of the Afri-
can race in this country; has been fully accomplished by the abolition of slav-
ery.” He continued, 
Negro slavery was recognized by our law as an infraction of the rights in-
separable from human nature; and tended to promote idleness, selfishness 
and tyranny in one part of the community, a destruction of the domestic re-
lations and utter debasement in the other part… Slavery may be abolished; 
but to strengthen and confirm the sentiment which opposed it will continue 
to be useful and desirable so long as selfishness, cruelty, the lust of domin-
ion, and indifference to the rights of the weak, the poor and the ignorant, 
have a place in the hearts of men.66 
 
As Burdick’s inclusion of this case demonstrates, even without explicit com-
mentary, authors’ choices about the content of their property law casebooks re-
flected a wide range of views about slavery at the time.  
For over a decade after 1915, most casebooks continued to reference sev-
eral cases involving the trade of enslaved people as exemplary illustrations of 
property disputes.67 However, in the 1930s and 40s, after significant activism 
protesting segregation and Jim Crow, the number significantly dwindled. Fur-
ther, as casebook authors began to omit cases involving property in enslaved 
 
66 Burdick, supra n. 30. 
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people, they also began to omit the portions of decisions that cited cases involv-
ing property in enslaved people.68 Most casebooks dropped all such cases, with 
a few exceptions; University of Chicago Law School Dean Harry Bigelow, for 
example, included many slavery cases in several editions of his casebook 
through 1942. After that, casebook authors adopted a new norm of totally eras-
ing the history of slavery from the study of property law.  
However, as they phased out traces of slavery from their casebooks in the 
1930s and 40s, many casebook authors also began to incorporate cases that up-
held the validity of racially restrictive covenants.69 This incorporation, at this 
time, represents a delay in deeming this law important to the canon. After all, 
the use of racially restrictive covenants in the United States began in the 1890s, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of racial covenants in Corrigan 
v. Buckley in 1926.70  In another 1922 case upholding racial covenants that ap-
peared in a 1933 casebook, Parmalee v. Morris, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan recited the Redeemers’ notion that civil rights were “special treatment, 
writing that “the issue involved… is a simple one, i.e., shall the law applicable 
to restrictions as to occupancy contained in deeds of real estate be enforced or 
shall one be absolved from the provisions of the law simply because he is a ne-
gro?”71 Casebooks similarly delayed incorporating cases about racial zoning, 
which the Supreme Court had declared unconstitional in 1917, though for even 
longer. Racial zoning did not appear in casebooks until 1948.72 That same year, 
that the Supreme Court finally invalidated racial covenants in Shelley v. Kra-
emer. Though authors incorporated Shelley into their casebooks relatively 
 
68 Park, supra note 10, at 1998. 
69 Los Angeles v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680 (1919) (Bentley 1933, 1940; Fraser 1941, 59-63); 
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573 (1918);  (Bigelow and Tefft 1940, Brown 1941); Meade 
v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295 (1938) (Mcdougal and Smith 1948). In Letteau v. Ellis, a Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of changed conditions to find that en-
forcement of a racial covenant no longer served the original purpose. Letteau v. Ellis 122 
Cal.App. 584 (1932) (Burby 532-36, 1943). 
70 See Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 
115 POL. SCI. Q. 541, 544 (2000); Corrigan v. Buckley 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).  
71 Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625 (1922), in BYRON R. BENTLEY, BUSINESS LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY 264 (1933). 
72 Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 275 (1938), in MYRES SMITH AND DAVID HABER 
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INTRODUCTION (1948). 
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quickly, they seem to have done so with thinly veiled reluctance: Aigler, for ex-
ample, tucked a citation to the case into an unobtrusive footnote in 195173; By-
ron Bentley, who had included many cases validating racial covenants in prior 
editions, did not offer a substantive update of the law, but merely left out the 
overturned cases and cited Shelley without describing its holding in a hypothet-
ical.74  
Though casebooks soon began to treat caselaw about racial zoning and ra-
cial covenants more thoroughly, they never provided historical explanation for 
the antagonism to Black property rights that they illustrate. Indeed, an Execu-
tive committee and the Supreme Court of the United States both proved willing 
to make the connection between the racialized landscape of property and the 
history of slavery in the United States before any property law professors were. 
In 1968, President Johnson’s National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders 
released the Kerner Report, which began its account with the history of slavery 
and racist institutional development after abolition, and characterized the racial 
unrest in 1967 as “the culmination of 300 years of racial prejudice.” In 1968, in 
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Company, the Justices also held 7-2 that racial discrimi-
nation in housing constituted “badges and incidents of slavery” that the Thir-
teenth Amendment had empowered Congress to eliminate.75  
The first time a property law casebook articulated the connection between 
racial discrimination in housing and slavery did so obliquely: Donahue and his 
co-authors included Jones alongside Johnson and the sit-in cases in 1974. In 
1978, Chused incorporated the first independent section on the history of slav-
ery and the abolition movement to ever appear in a property law casebook, con-
sisting of selections from Dred Scott v. Sandford, a discussion of limitations on 
Black mobility and citizenship during slavery, and the complicated legal issues 
involved in the transition to freedom.76 A few others followed,77 and in 1993, 
the first edition of Singer’s casebook drew from Dred Scott, and a variety of 
other sources by historians and Critical Race Theorists.78 
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However, unlike with conquest, casebooks’ initial reckonings with the his-
tory of slavery never led to new norms in content across casebooks. Some of 
the most widely used property law casebooks today do not mention slavery at 
all, or mention it only in passing.79 The current edition of the leading casebook 
by Dukeminier and his coauthors, for example, mentions slavery exactly twice: 
first, in a footnote in reference to an English judge who opposed slavery in Eng-
land, and second, in reference to John Locke’s identification of an inherent 
right to property in one’s person (en route to a discussion of property in human 
cells): “Slavery, obviously, was in opposition to that proposition,” Dukeminier 
and his co-authors write, “but slavery has been abolished. So, can we now say, 
without qualification, that you have property in yourself?”80 While here, Duke-
minier’s casebook conspicuously avoids the history and legacy of American 
chattel slavery, it elsewhere illustrates how easy it is to unknowingly reinforce 
erasure of the topic.  
Like all property law casebooks and Bar examiners, Dukeminier uses the 
terms “Whiteacre” and “Blackacre” as legal kadigans for a hypothetical estate; 
uniquely, however, it also speculates about how these terms became traditional. 
After noting, “just why no one knows for sure,” it offers the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s suggestion that it was traditional to denote lands growing different 
crops by color (“peas and beans are black, corn and potatoes are white”), and 
the possibility of lands receiving rents (“black rents are payable in produce, 
white rents in silver”). However, the terms also constituted the title of a pro-
slavery novel that Dukeminier’s casebook does not mention, which appeared in  
1856, the same year the Court decided Dred Scott, from a prominent Confeder-
ate press. William Burwell, the author of Whiteacre vs. Blackacre, was the son 
of a Virginia politician by the same name who served as private secretary to 
Thomas Jefferson, in the Virginia House of Delegates, and in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and enslaved nearly 100 people. The younger Burwell was 
also a slaveowner, served in the Virginia House of Delegates, and his daughter 
Letitia followed him in writing books that vigorously defended slavery and “the 
Lost Cause.”81 In Burwell’s allegorical novel, which formed part of the literary 
response to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s anti-slavery classic Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
“Whiteacre” was an incompetent northern farm and “Blackacre,” a southern 
plantation labored upon by loyal, hardworking slaves.  
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It is indeed difficult to know just how the terms “White Acre” and “Black 
Acre,” which seem to have appeared fairly infrequently in English legal trea-
tises,82 became popular as legal kadigans, but surely Burwell's novel  is a part 
of the story. Between ancient methods of denoting crops and Gray’s liberal use 
of the term “Black Acre” across his casebook, this novel likely raised American 
consciousness of these terms, in ways we cannot understand without studying 
the history of slavery and its impact upon American property law.  
 
So far, scholars have not agreed on the importance of this endeavor. 
Though an imperfect metric, an analysis of the 25 most cited articles on the law 
of real property published between 1990 and 2015 shows that the topics of con-
quest and slavery remain exceedingly marginal.83 Only two address these topics 
substantially, together and at all; one additional article mentions conquest in a 
footnote, and seven other articles mention slavery in a footnote, in passing, or 
referenced the abstract condition of enslavement rather than the history of 
American chattel slavery. The two scholars who discuss slavery and conquest 
in the history of American property law, offer observations that, if taken up, 
would require rethinking many fundamental presuppositions of the field. In 
Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris wrote that “[t]he legal legacy of slavery 
and of the seizure of land from Native American peoples is not merely a regime 
of property law that is (mis)informed by racist and ethnocentric themes”84; ra-
ther, out of “the parallel systems of domination of Black and Native American 
people,” she explains, “were created racially contingent forms of property and 
property rights.”85 In Sovereignty and Property, Singer analyzes Native nations’ 
property rights through American Indian Law decisions, including Johnson, to 
bluntly assert that “both property rights and political power in the United States 
 
82 See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLANDE, 
OR, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON (2d ed. 1629); FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION 
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Law-Dictionary: Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the British Law 441 
(Payne 3d ed 1820).   
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are associated with a system of racial caste.”86 This article builds on these ob-
servations, and the work of many scholars whose writing does not appear on 
this list, to offer an explanation of how the legacies of this history appear in the 
structure, practices, and institutions of property law. 
II. “ACQUISITION,” OR EXPROPRIATION & THE PRODUCTION OF 
PROPERTY   
Undoing the erasure of conquest and slavery from the property law canon 
does not only require new historical information. It requires rethinking the theo-
retical conclusions we draw from new understandings of practice about the dy-
namics and impact of institutions. To illustrate this process of revision, I begin, 
below, with the broad topic of “acquisition,” with which many property law 
courses and casebooks begin. Acquisition has typically appeared in property 
law as an abstract theoretical question about “how unowned things come to be 
owned.”87 However, if we recognize that the most significant commodities in 
the colonies were land and enslaved people—if we begin with the premises that 
those lands belonged to sovereign Native nations, and the African people 
brought here were deprived of their inherent bodily autonomy and subjugated 
by force—we must acknowledge that historically, “acquisition” did not cen-
trally concern “unowned things.”88  
Rather, in the English colonies, establishing claims to other people’s sover-
eign homelands and personhood constituted a process of collective expropria-
tion, which exacted immeasurable costs from Indigenous and Black communi-
ties; colonists then rendered these resources property using legal strategies that 
have become hallmarks of the institutions that they engendered.  In property 
law courses, the three main theories of acquisition—discovery, labor, and pos-
session— describe how property interests arise in the first place and offer legal 
justifications for who holds title to property. Typically, they are presented as 
abstract rules about individual acquisition, which dictate that entitlements 
should be distributed to the “first-in-time,” on the basis of “labor” or “invest-
ment,” or to the party already in “possession,” to preserve the status quo, re-
spectively. However, the history from which these theories arise shows that 
 
86 Joseph Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991). 
87 Bethany Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE 
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albeit one that Congress had earlier attempted to deny: the lands it carved up on paper were 
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they each also guided collective processes of expropriation and property crea-
tion that inverted the abstract, conceptual principles for which they are now 
known. That is, the Discovery Doctrine rather nullified first-in-time rights, as it 
imposed a racial order on the world; the labor theory denied the labor of non-
Europeans, the key labor force in the colonies; and the process of taking posses-
sion was one of subverting possession that made extractive, dispossessory tech-
niques a part of the system for processing the resources thereby “acquired.”  
The sections below describe how the Discovery Doctrine and the theories 
of labor and possession shaped the development of property law in the United 
States by establishing a fundamental hierarchy in the order of humanity as the 
basis of its jurisdictional and property claims and innovating practices and insti-
tutions to further English occupation in America and support the growth of the 
colonies. Part IIA addresses the international law of Discovery, which author-
ized European expeditions to conquer and enslave non-European people. By de-
scribing the evolution of the rule, I show how John Marshall’s rule in Johnson 
v. M’Intosh upheld the European hierarchy at its core within a colonization 
model of limited inclusion. Parts IIB and IIC turn to the history that Marshall 
references: how colonists took actual possession of the land, beginning in Part 
IIB(i) with how the labor theory linked ideas about non-European others to con-
ceptions about the value of land. Part IIB(ii) describes how the English de-
ployed law to create property in America. Many key features of the land system 
that give real estate its tremendous market liquidity today—the survey system, 
comprehensive title registry, and easy foreclosure—emerged as ways to resolve 
the technological challenges of conquest; further, colonists rendered enslaved 
people another major form of property and component of their own wealth with 
laws racializing slavery as an institution and disengaging it from the mission 
project from which it sprang. Part IIC reflects on the practices of dispossession 
that comprised colonists’ efforts to create this property, and the constant vio-
lence that was required to maintain possession of it. Through the examples of 
conquest by settlement and the fugitive slave controversies that arose as a re-
sponse to enslaved people’s inherent self-possession, it considers the ways that 
dispossession and displacement became means of producing value in property 
that was primarily monetary and determined by race. 
A. The Racial Hierarchy at the Heart of the Discovery Doctrine  
Today, the Discovery Doctrine is taught as the law of finders-- the rule that 
the first to find a thing may keep it.89 The 1823 case Johnson v. M’Intosh estab-
lishes the international law doctrine of discovery, which contains the principle 
of first-possessors, as the basis of U.S. sovereignty and Native title as the origin 
of all land titles in the United States. In this section, I begin by describing how 
 
89 In property law classes today, a case involving rights to a baseball thrown to the crowd is 
most often used to teach an abstract version of this rule. Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 
31833731 (Cal.Superior Dec 18, 2002) (NO. 400545).  




the international doctrine upon which Johnson drew developed, in order to 
highlight the constancy of discovery’s basic legal fiction90: a European claim of 
entitlement to non-European lands and people. In this context, the principle of 
first-in-time ordered relations between European nations vying for domination 
outside of Europe; insofar as this European project denied first-in-time entitle-
ments in others, its operation was dependent on the hierarchical order privileg-
ing European Christian claims. The U.S. rule of discovery laid out in Johnson 
affirms this divisive inheritance, and adopts a model of limited inclusion by 
mapping out three categories of rights in relation to land and one another—
those held by Native nations, private citizens, and the United States. 91 In U.S. 
law, there is no clearer description of the structural racial determinants of 
American real property than that which appears in Johnson.  
Slavery and conquest in America both stem originally from the same doctri-
nal root of the international law of Discovery, though from different points of 
its long history. The Discovery Doctrine was early articulated through the Ro-
man Catholic Church’s notion that it had worldwide papal jurisdiction and the 
duty to build a universal Christian Commonwealth.92 During the period of the 
Crusades, canon lawyers developed the idea that “holy war” waged by Chris-
tians against infidels was “just war.” In the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV 
focused on Christians’ legal authority to dispossess non-Christians of domin-
ium—a claim to land entailing both sovereignty and property.93 In the fifteenth 
century, Portuguese and Spanish raids of islands off the Iberian Coast prompted 
Pope Eugenius to issue a papal bull in 1436 affirming Portuguese claims that 
 
90 The fiction is denoted by the very term “Discovery,” which suggests that the “things” to 
which colonists laid claim were unowned and available for Europeans to take. 
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not to matter.” Dukeminier et al., supra note 80, at 12. This legal fiction was also a source 
of discomfort for Marshall, who, notwithstanding his own racism, called European discov-
ery claims “extravagant” and “pompous” in Johnson. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 
590 (1823). 
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their conquests were on behalf of Christianity. The Romanus Pontifex justified 
conquest by referring to the savage ways of infidel natives, in arguments that 
Pope Nicolas repeated in the Dum Diversas of 1452 and another Romanus Pon-
tifex in 1455. These papal bulls authorized Portugal’s ongoing entry into West 
Africa to seize and enslave people, through which the Portuguese initiated the 
transatlantic slave trade, and which the English joined in the seventeenth cen-
tury, after their successful establishment of colonies in mainland America and 
the Caribbean.  
Around the turn of the sixteenth century, disputes between Spain and Portu-
gal about their “first discovery” rights prompted new articulations of the Dis-
covery Doctrine with three important, lasting features. First, Pope Alexander VI 
established a principle of noninterference in conquest with his Inter Caetera II, 
which in 1493 demarcated a north-south boundary line about 300 miles west of 
the Azore Islands, separating Spain’s western zone of “discovery” from Portu-
gal’s eastern zone.94 Second, in 1532, the interventions of Franciscus de Victo-
ria, lead advisor to the King of Spain, revised the fundamental principles of 
conquest to base them not only on excluding non-Christians from the realm of 
humanity, but on their inclusion under a European-led Law of Nations. Against 
a host of scholarly opinions to the contrary,95 Victoria argued that Indians had 
reason and natural law rights of dominium.96 However, he added, Europeans 
had rights “to travel in the lands in question… and the natives may not prevent 
them”; if Native people violated European-defined “natural law,” or the Law of 
Nations, Europeans would be justified in waging “just war” against them.97 The 
difference between inclusion and exclusion models of conquest was famously 
debated in 1551 in Valladolid by Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de 
Sepúlveda, who argued that “Indians” were “natural slaves.” In contrast to a 
model where Native people were wholly excluded from the realm of law, with 
no “right to have rights,” as it were, in the new model of formal inclusion, Na-
tive people held certain rights, but not rights to determine their meaning, scope, 
or enforcement.98  
Third, Victoria shifted the legal basis of authority for conquest from papal 
sanction to customary international law, creating new opportunities for England 
and France to make claims and articulate discovery rules that justified them. 
For example, Spain and Portugal had long claimed that their Discovery rights 
began upon their mere arrival in non-Christian lands, and were consummated 
 
94 With the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, Spain and Portugal modified that line. Pagden, 
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through performative rites, such as planting flags or crosses on the shore.99 
Though Holland, France, and England also all long made claims based on simi-
lar rituals,100 they also pursued other arguments,101 and into the seventeenth 
century, England embraced the idea that “discovery” encompassed an addi-
tional requirement, beyond first arrival—being the first to achieve actual pos-
session, or occupation. Following an understanding of English rights highly in-
fluenced by Victoria’s ideas, conveyed to the English-speaking public through 
George Peckham’s “True Reporte,”102 the English pursued their rights to trade 
in America and to be accepted in this traffic by Native peoples under the Law 
of Nations, on pain of provoking “just war.”103 
Johnson v. M’Intosh draws from this repertoire of arguments from interna-
tional and recapitulates the last chapter of its history to articulate a version of 
the Discovery Doctrine for U.S. law. Johnson specifically concerned the ques-
tion of dominium, or sovereignty and property in land, not the enslavement of 
people (though in a decision two years later called The Antelope, Marshall iden-
tified the theory of just war as the positive law origin of the transatlantic slave 
trade).104 Marshall explained that acquisition, or appropriation, was the impetus 
of the discovery rule: “[o]n the discovery of this immense continent, the great 
nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they 
could respectively acquire.” The doctrine, he wrote, was a non-compete agree-
ment between European nations, determined by the law of Nations105: “as they 
were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid 
conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to establish a prin-
ciple, which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisi-
tion, which they all asserted, should be regulated as between themselves.”106 In 
Marshall’s articulation of the rule, “discovery gave title to the government by 
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European 
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governments, which title might be consummated by possession.” Discovery 
claims, he found, had passed through sovereign chains of title from different 
first-in-time conquerors-- Britain, Spain, and France-- to the United States, by 
various treaties and purchase.107   
In Johnson, as in other iterations of discovery, it is important to note that 
the first-in-time rule had no meaning without the hierarchy that subordinated 
non-Christian, non-European dominium to European claims. The operative ele-
ment of the agreement between European nations competing for conquests was 
the conceit of discovery itself, not the subsidiary rules of its order; without the 
hierarchy that placed their entitlements above others, and the correspondent fic-
tions about those peoples—their lack of reason, their bestiality, their need to be 
“saved”-- they would have had to leave first possessors elsewhere undis-
turbed.108 This primacy however does not render the rule of the first-in-time 
meaningless, but rather highlights an important aspect of the racial legal world 
that conquest engendered– selective application of rules according to hierarchy. 
In accordance with this principle of hierarchy, Marshall accepted that European 
“title by conquest[,] acquired and maintained by force,” was the unequivocal 
source of the United States’ sovereignty, and justified this inheritance with his 
own nineteenth century iteration of the traditional narrative: “the character and 
religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people 
over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.”109   
Within this hierarchy, it is equally crucial to observe, Johnson did not deny 
Native nations’ sovereignty and rights. Reflecting an understanding of the his-
tory of colonists’ transactions with Native peoples, Marshall acknowledged Na-
tive nations’ original, ubiquitous claims:  
the whole of the territory, in the letters patent described… was held, occu-
pied, and possessed in full sovereignty, by various independent tribes or na-
tions of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their respective portions of the 
territory, and the absolute owners and proprietors of the soil; and who nei-
ther acknowledged nor owed any allegiance or obedience to any European 
sovereign or state whatever.  
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Instead of excluding or refusing to acknowledge Native title, under a model of 
inclusion, with limitations, the Court assumed its prerogative to define its pa-
rameters under U.S. law. The heart of the factual dispute in Johnson, indeed, 
turned precisely on the legal question of how the United States’ option rights, 
under the international law of discovery, affected the inherent, natural sover-
eignty of Native nations-- in Marshall’s words, the question of “the power of 
the Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be 
sustained in the Courts of this country.” 110 The facts involved the pretense that 
the parties took title to the same land from different parties111-- the U.S. govern-
ment (M’Intosh)112 and the Illinois and Wabash Land Company (Johnson), 
which purchased directly from the Piankeshaw and Illinois nations.113  
Under Marshall’s analysis, the inter-European Discovery principle was the 
basis of an “absolute, ultimate” sovereignty,114 “subject only to the Indian title 
of occupancy,”115 that gave the United States the power to could prescribe the 
laws of sovereignty and property within the lands that it therewith affirmed as 
its domain: “the title to lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend en-
tirely on the law of the nation in which they lie.” In Johnson, Marshall exer-
cised that authority to recognize Native nations’ dominium, in keeping with a 
long and undeniable tradition of British practice of purchasing their lands; fur-
ther, he prohibited states and private entities from terminating that title, and 
placed important limits on the scope of the United States’ power to do so.116 
The United States, he wrote, “maintain… an exclusive right to extinguish the 
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.”117 The federal 
government’s right to terminate Native title, though exclusive, was in other 
words limited to two approaches: consensual purchase or war, which Marshall 
 
110 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572. 
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nine years later clarified had to be defensive war.118 With this rule, Johnson also 
affirmed the prohibitions on state and private purchasers—whose abuses and 
predations were a major problem at the time-- that Congress had enacted legis-
latively many years before in its Trade and Intercourse, better known as Non-
Intercourse Acts.119 It made the United States the only entity to which Native 
nations could freely transfer title to land, in a restraint on alienation, which 
Singer has likened to a right of first refusal.120 By the same stroke, it therefore 
declared that Native nations’ sovereign rights were not full rights of self-deter-
mination, and confirmed the United States’ “extravagant” assertions about the 
European entitlements it inherited121-- an inheritance of domination that Mar-
shall captured in the famous line, “Conquest gives a title which the Courts of 
the conqueror cannot deny.”122  
Despite subsequent events and legal developments after Johnson that fur-
ther diminished the geographical and legal scope of these rights, the amount of 
land under Native dominium today remains approximately equivalent to that 
held by California.123 The limitations it affirmed on state and private actors’ 
ability to directly purchase land from Native nations remain the cause of action 
in live disputes.124 Further, the fact that “all land titles in the United States orig-
inate in Indian title,” as Joseph Singer has repeatedly underscored, has enor-
mous moral, practical, and systemic consequences for all privately held lands in 
the country.125 On the one hand, the central presumption of European hierarchy 
that fueled conquest creates overarching, ongoing problems of legitimacy. As 
Singer points out, the extent to which “our land titles originate in the disposses-
sion of first possessors places subsequent titles in doubt,” as a matter of the le-
gitimacy of ownership claims and the normative justifications for property 
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rights in the United States.126 Finally, the sovereign’s right “to prescribe those 
rules by which property may be acquired and preserved,”127 which Johnson 
shows derive from conquest in the United States, made those rules of property a 
tool of conquest itself, in ways that the next two sections will explore.  
In other words, in addition to broad question of legitimacy and morality, 
the legacy of dispossession also resides within many structural aspects of the 
system of property law itself. By examining the way that English colonists es-
tablished and grew their settlements, the next section highlights the ways that 
English colonists used and innovated property laws to further their taking pos-
session of, or expropriating native nations’ lands and African people’s bodies. 
In other words, what English colonists did in relation to Native nations to 
achieve Johnson’s second step of possession—these relations which “were to 
be regulated by themselves”128-- developed the property system and market in 
lands for which Johnson, two centuries on, would clarify rules to shore up the 
certainty of transactions, and thereby support its continuous growth.129 
B. The Labor of Producing Property in Theory and Practice 
The labor theory of property concerns the processes by which property is 
produced, and identifies entitlement in the party that invests their labor to create 
the value of that property. It is intimately connected to the Discovery Doctrine 
as a justification for entitlement, and the two theories should be understood in 
their historical relation, rather than simply as alternative, abstract principles. In 
colonial America, colonists achieved the second step of Johnson’s discovery 
rule—taking actual possession of the country—by expropriating resources and 
rendering them property. This section addresses how the labor theory’s account 
about property creation describes the historical process of property creation in 
the colonies. The labor of conquest entailed expropriating others’ lands and 
bodies as well as the use of laws and development of institutions to render those 
entities into property. The labor theory captures this development in its long-
lasting and influential narratives about Native people and how, in Marshall’s 
words from Johnson two centuries after colonists’ first arrival, that “to leave 
them in possession of their country was to leave the country a wilderness.”  
In its abstract form, the theory of acquisition that anchors entitlements in la-
bor points to the morale rationales of desert, efficiency, and the prevention of 
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waste.130 Part IIB(i) examines these ideas in the most famous articulation of the 
labor theory-- Locke’s account of producing property-- to show how in its colo-
nial context, under the umbrella of the “discovery” hierarchy, it imbricated ra-
cial ideology with the creation of property value. That is, the labor theory not 
only generated ideas about “Indians,” but intrinsically linked those ideas to 
conceptions about the value of the land by suggesting that Europeans cultivated 
land, while Native peoples left it to “waste”; there is no mention of enslaved la-
bor.131 If we understand the account as primarily about agricultural practices in 
the colonies, this European exceptionalism is known to be a bald racial lie. 
However, I argue in Part IIB(ii) that this exceptionalism is correct if we under-
stand Locke to refer to the labor of property production more broadly, which is 
romanticized by focusing on agrarian elements alone. In many unique and insti-
tutionally significant ways, colonists worked to make land and people cogniza-
ble as “property” under law: they developed systems for comprehensive title 
registration, rectangular surveys, land grants and homesteading incentives, the 
principle of partus sequitur ventrem and antimiscegenation laws, and easy fore-
closure, to change the very meaning of the concept of property itself. These 
new property rules and institutions governed the removal and enslavement of 
Native and African people in order to manufacture value that was both depend-
ent on evolving ideologies about those groups’ racial difference and monetary 
above all. 
1. Locke’s Theory of Property Creation 
Locke’s writing on property in the Second Treatise most famously captures 
the idea that “Whatsoever [one] removes out of the State that Nature hath pro-
vided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.” Locke’s ideas on property 
and government heavily influenced the Founders, especially Thomas Jefferson, 
who drew on the Second Treatise to draft the Declaration of Independence. 
Locke was an aide to the Earl of Shaftesbury, secretary to the Lord Proprietors 
of Carolina, the Council of Trade and Plantations, and a member of the Board 
 
130 Most property law courses teach the theory of labor and investment as a source of enti-
tlement using the case INS v. Associated Press. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215 (1918). 
131 For Locke, only “just war” could justify enslavement. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND 
TREATISE (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).  




of Trade, the part of English government responsible for colonial administra-
tion.132 He read widely about colonial expeditions,133 and wrote many memo-
randa and policy recommendations while in these positions on the various colo-
nies, settlement projects, and the institution of government and property in 
America, including the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina and its agrarian 
laws, as well as a reform proposal for Virginia in 1696. He was also an investor 
in the Company of Merchant Adventurers to trade with the Bahamas and the 
Royal Africa Company, which held the Crown’s monopoly on the English 
slave-trade until the late seventeenth century.134 In another example of another 
lacuna fostered by erasure, though the commentary on Locke’s writings that has 
accumulated since his lifetime would fill libraries, the first article to consider 
his theories in relation to his involvement in the colonizing project in America 
did not appear until the mid 1980s, three centuries after the publication of the 
Second Treatise135; scholars began to examine Locke’s ideas about slavery in 
light of his investments in the trade only slightly earlier, beginning in 1969.136 
Locke’s labor theory, in keeping with the English rule of discovery, 
acknowledges some fundamental rights to property in Native peoples. He ar-
gues, for example, that “the wild Indian,” like all others, derives property rights 
from his labor in the hunter-gatherer context: if he harvests a nut or gives chase 
to a deer to kill it, Locke offers, he too is entitled to “the Fruit, or Venison.”137 
However, Locke also acknowledges that his main purpose in the exposition is 
to describe rights in land, “the chief matter of Property being now not the Fruits 
of the Earth, and the Beasts that subsist on it, but the Earth it self.” Of land, he 
writes,  
… I think it is plain, that Property in that too is acquired as the former. As 
much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the 
Product of, so much is his Property. He by his Labour does, as it were, in-
close it from the Common. 
 
132 James Tully, Rediscovering America: the Two treatises and aboriginal rights, in JAMES 
TULLY, AN APPROACH TO ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137, 140 
(Quentin Skinner ed. 1993). 
133 JOHN HARRISON, JOHN AND PETER LASLETT EDS., THE LIBRARY OF JOHN LOCKE (1965). 
134 Tully, supra note 132, at 141; Banner, supra note 7, at 47; David Armitage, Locke, Car-
olina, and the Two Treatises, 32 POL. THEORY 602 (2004). 
135 Herman Lebovics, The Uses of America in Locke's Second Treatise of Government, 47 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 567 (1986); Tully, supra note 132, at 137. See also Barbara Arneil, Trade, 
Plantations and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism, 55 J. 
HIST IDEAS 591 (1994). 
136 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 118-21 (1969); 
James Farr, So Vile and Miserable an Estate: The Problem of Slavery in Locke's Political 
Thought, 14 Political Theory 263 (1986); Wayne Glausser, Three Approaches to Locke and 
the Slave Trade, 51 Journal of the History of Ideas 199 (1990). 
137 Locke, supra note 131, at 287, 289.  
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His specific description of the kind of labor that creates entitlements to lands 
categorically excludes “the wild Indian,” who, he has said, “knows no In-
closure, and is still a tenant in common.”138 In other words, this theory echoed a 
massively popular English characterization of Native people as less civilization-
ally developed than Europeans, to explain that while they had certain funda-
mental rights, they could not claim property in land. 
Locke’s, like older variations of the colonial labor theory, as we will see, 
portrays colonists as producing “property” in land-- not the Native people from 
whom they took that land, nor the African people, not mentioned in the text, 
who they forced to labor upon it. As pertains to the agricultural labor of “till-
ing” and “planting,” this representation was patently untrue in the colonies, ex-
emplifying another selective application of theory according to the hierarchy of 
the Discovery Doctrine. The principal source of labor that colonists relied on 
for the production of their cash crops, including tobacco, rice, and cotton, were, 
of course, the people that they enslaved. Their forced importation to the Ameri-
cas began in the early sixteenth century by Spain, followed soon after by Portu-
gal, to supplement the labor of enslaved Native peoples in the Caribbean and 
later, the mainland.139 The English, French, and Dutch joined the African slave 
trade in the early seventeenth century140: the first record of English colonists’ 
purchase of Africans was in 1619, from Dutch slavers in Virginia141; in the 
1630s, the first records of Black slaves in Pennsylvania and Maryland appeared, 
and Massachusetts constructed the first vessel for the slave trade, which first 
brought enslaved Africans to Connecticut in 1637.142  
In the 1660s and through the 1680s, the number of enslaved persons began 
to burgeon in the colonies as the Crown promoted African enslaved labor 
through its monopoly company143 and colonists increasingly built their trade 
with Barbados.144 In 1683, Colonel Nicholas Spencer, secretary of Virginia, 
 
138 Id. at 287. 
139 HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: 1440-
1870 92-113 (1999). 
140 Id. at 153-62. 
141 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROCESS (1978). 
142 Thomas, supra note 139, at 177. See also WENDY WARREN, NEW ENGLAND BOUND: 
SLAVERY AND COLONIZATION IN EARLY AMERICA (2016). 
143 Perhaps motivated by a desire to preserve English servant labor for the home country, 
Charles II “invite[d] all of his subjects to subscribe to a new joint stock”—the Royal Afri-
can Company. ANTHONY S. PARENT, JR., FOUL MEANS: THE FORMATION OF A SLAVE 
SOCIETY IN VIRGINIA 1660-1740 60 (2003). 
144 Id. at 67. 




boasted that “Blacks can make [Tobacco] cheaper than Whites”145; between 
1670 and 1690, the population increased from 2,000 to 5,000, to comprise 9 
percent of Virginia’s population and more than ½ of its bound labor force.146 
The Second Treatise, which appeared during this time, never mentioned en-
slaved Africans and justified slavery only on the basis of just war-- referencing 
contemporary arguments for enslaving Native people147 and also, perhaps, the 
tradition of discovery that gave birth to the transatlantic slave trade.148 By 1710, 
the number of enslaved Black people in the colony was estimated at “upwards 
15,000” and constituted “the mass of bound laborers; in Anthony Parent’s 
words, “Virginia had become a slave society.”149  
Similarly, Locke’s evolutionary narrative characterizes Indigenous land 
use in a way that was “simply counterfactual, and the settlers knew it.”150 The 
English notion that Native people left land to “lye waste and free” contradicted 
the numerous written observations colonists left describing the Native towns, 
villages, and “carefully cultivated,” orderly crop systems they found up and 
down the eastern seaboard.151 In Jamestown, John Smith reported that “Each 
 
145 Id. at 60. 
146 Id. at 74. 
147 See generally Brad Hinshelwood, The Carolinian Context of John Locke’s Theory of 
Slavery, 41 Political Theory 562 (2013). 
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condition of enslavement, and to “get a law pass’d restraining of inhumane Severities… to-
wards Slaves.” Farr, supra note 136, at 269; Jennifer Welchman, Locke on Slavery and In-
alienable Rights, 25 CAN. J. PHIL. 67, 74 (1995). 
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151 Id at 52; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, SETTLING WITH INDIANS: THE MEETINGS OF 
ENGLISH AND INDIAN CULTURES IN AMERICA, 1580-1640 81-84 (1980); SAILORS 
NARRATIVES OF VOYAGES ALONG THE NEW ENGLAND COAST 1524-1624 19 (George Par-
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don, 1608); THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER 1606-1609 173 (Philip 
L. Barbour, ed. 1969); WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620-1647 85 
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household knoweth their owne lands & gardens”152; and in 1709 in North Caro-
lina, John Lawson observed that Native groups “have no Fence to part one an-
others Lots in their Corn-Fields; but every Man knows his own, and it scarce 
ever happens, that they rob one another of so much as an Ear of Corn.”153 Stuart 
Banner points out that English property arrangements of the time were strik-
ingly similar to many Native groups’ practices, which allocated farming plots to 
families and maintained common resource areas for the community; the Eng-
lish, like some Native communities, also planted fields together and separated 
different family’s rows by a narrow strip of grass.154 While colonists imported 
fixed-field agriculture practices from England, as Peter Thomas notes, swidden 
systems, like those used by Native groups in the Connecticut River Valley and 
“throughout the world have frequently produced equal, or even higher, returns 
than fields under continuous cultivation.”155 
Importantly, the labor theory generated ideas about Native peoples that not 
only suggested their inferiority, but also emphasized the impact of their posses-
sion on the value of the land. In this respect, Locke’s summary merely echoed 
older and well-known colonial accounts. In 1609, for example, the Puritan 
preacher Robert Gray invoked the popular idea  
that these savages have no particular propriety in any part of parcel of that 
country, but only a general residency there, as wild beasts in the forest; for 
they range and wander up and down the country without any law or govern-
ment, being led only by their own lusts and sensuality. There is not meum 
and tuum amongst them. So that if the whole land should be taken from 
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them, there is not a man that can complain of any particular wrong done 
unto him.156 
 
In 1629, John Winthrop wrote in New England, “This savage people ruleth over 
many lands without title or property, for they enclose no ground”157; and 
Locke’s contemporary William Loddington too presented an evolutionary ra-
tionale for England’s entitlement to others’ soil: “England was once as rough 
and rugged as America, and the Inhabitants as blind and barbarous as the Indi-
ans.”158 The rationales of desert, efficiency, and the prevention of waste associ-
ated with the labor theory today derive, through Locke, from these arguments 
that colonists deserved the land by virtue of their industry, which made it more 
valuable than Native people could. It is important to remember that during the 
time of their production, these arguments not only inaccurately represented the 
different groups who were cultivating the lands in question, but also operated 
alongside an emerging market on which land enclosures acquired monetary 
value for colonists only upon Native removal from them, actual or projected.159 
As I will show in the next section, these narratives gave cover to the more 
controversial activities colonists engaged in to expropriate resources and turn 
them into property. A variety of material factors facilitated the description of 
this expropriation, for example, as claims to vacant land: many English settled 
on the grounds of villages where the population had been destroyed by the rav-
ages of new European diseases,160 or claimed fields temporarily out of use due 
to Native communities’ crop rotation or preservation of hunting grounds.161 
Conflating a variety of circumstances, colonists tendentiously conclude that 
“Native occupancy did not involve sufficient “labor” to perfect a “property in-
terest”162: William Penn called the lands in America “waste or uncultivated 
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Country”163; Samuel Purchas argued, “if any Countrey be not possessed by 
other men, every man by Law of Nature and Humanitie hath right of Planta-
tion,” and “[l]awyers in England and throughout Europe agreed that settlers had 
a legal right to occupy uninhabited land.”164 In a range of arguments that 
blurred together or became interchangeable, colonists suggested that Native 
people were not using the lands, their use was not sufficient to justify their 
claims, or there were no people on the lands—that the land was vacuum domi-
cilium—to make a claim at all.  
The alchemy that bound together ideas about the value of land with ideas 
about the inferiority of Native people was highly significant to the construction 
of property in the context of conquest. It found its parallel in ideas about Afri-
cans that similarly suggested they existed a lower stage of civilizational devel-
opment or were by nature closer to beasts than humans, which facilitated their 
enslavement.165 The connection between ideas about non-whites and property 
value indexes processes that were crucial to the creation of property and prop-
erty value together: colonists imagined Native people to be absent as they con-
templated removing them to create property in land; ideas that Native and Afri-
can people were inferior to Europeans developed in conjunction with and 
justified their dispossession to create property as well. In other words, this pro-
cess of creating property endowed the most significant commodities on the 
market with monetary value only when they came into the possession of whites.   
2. The Use of Law to Produce Property in the Colonies 
It is not difficult to see how the colonial narratives described above coa-
lesced to fortify the lodestar ideology that acquisition, in American property 
law, has concerned “unowned things,” and the corresponding popular, durable 
mythology of America as terra nullius—open, vacant, virgin soil. These fictions 
of the theory obscure more than the presence, sovereignty, labor, and violence 
against Native and African peoples. They have also veiled the work that colo-
nists did singularly engage in to produce property in the colonies-- enclosing, 
dispossessing, and occupying Native and African peoples’ lands and bodies.  
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This section describes the specific legal practices and institutions colonists 
developed to further these endeavors, beginning with the widespread colonial 
purchase of land from Native nations, which rooted the land market in Native 
title, and including the survey and recording techniques they developed to or-
ganize their interests in these enclosures. Settlers’ “tilling” and “planting,” too, 
followed the conditions of land grants that colonial officials used to incentivize 
emigration. Not least, to build their capacity for occupation, they rendered cap-
tive human beings into another major form of property through laws that made 
the status of enslavement racial, hereditary, and perpetual, and disengaged it 
from the mission of conversion. Finally, colonists upended the ancient distinc-
tion in the English property tradition between real property and chattel property 
in order to balance the need to keep plantations whole with the demands of 
creditors. All these developments fostered the colonial market’s rapid growth 
through leveraging debt anchored in property produced through the racializa-
tion, lands and people understood as monetary equivalents,. 
To return to the overarching colonial mission of taking possession of lands, 
it is crucial to recognize that in every instance, Europeans’ ability to do so was 
challenged by the powerful presence of the existing sovereigns.166 The English, 
much to the chagrin of colonial company heads and administrators, understood 
upon arrival in Plymouth and Jamestown that they had no hope of taking lands 
by force from the Wampanoag or the Powhatan Confederacy.167 Thus, notwith-
standing English ideological flourishes about vacuum domicilium, colonists ar-
rived with instructions to “purchase their tytle, that wee may avoyde the least 
scruple of intrusion”; in many instances, they formally recognized Native title 
in Virginia, Massachusetts, and the Carolinas from the earliest days of settle-
ment.168 Colonists thereby sought permission for their occupation of lands from 
groups clearly in control of them, and called such payment a matter of “pru-
dence & Christian charity lest otherwise the Indians might have destroyed the 
first planters.”169 Moreover, the English faced difficulty not paying for these 
rights when French colonists in the area were doing so; and found few reasons 
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to object, when they could cheaply obtain occupation rights in this way, and get 
a foothold for stretching their claims to exclusive title.170  
English colonists thereby recognized Native property rights from the first, 
in practice, if not always in theory. As Banner points out, “There is no actual 
difference between respecting others’ property rights and treating them as if one 
is respecting their property rights. That’s what a property right is—the 
knowledge that one will be treated as a property owner.”171 This practice fit 
comfortably within the two-stage process of conquest Johnson later described: 
a grant from the Crown was not sufficient to consummate title, but merely au-
thorized colonists to seek actual possession. Colonial officials and private indi-
viduals did so by purchasing huge tracts of land from indigenous people, culti-
vated or not, while proliferating the labor theory,172 without seeing any 
contradiction between these justifications. Rather, these ideas appeared as argu-
ments in the alternative, along with the theory of “just war,” as when the Vir-
ginia Company described their settlement as legal because “there is roome suf-
ficient in the land… for them, and us… because they have violated the lawe of 
nations… But chieflie because Paspehay, one of their Kings, sold unto us for 
copper, land to inherit and inhabite.”173 In 1707, the New Hampshire Assembly 
could argue that when they arrived, the lands “were not onely then Vacuum 
Domicilium but a miserable desert,” but also that the their Ancestors “all along 
informed and assured us the said Lands were honestly and justly purchased.”174 
The labor theory, purchase, and the theory of just war were compatible as legal 
arguments safeguarding the end of possession.  
The activity of purchase anchored all chains of title in the country in Na-
tive title, as Johnson later acknowledged. Evidence indicates that the practice of 
memorializing these payments with recorded deeds did not become established 
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for many decades,175 due partly to the impermanent nature of settlement at the 
time, colonists’ preference for finding new lands rather than engaging in con-
flict over specific lands with one another, and because their inexact dealings 
may have stimulated more rapid settlement.176 Surveys were haphazard, as a re-
sult of colonists following “freedom of location” to choose the most desirable 
lands, although to a lesser extent in New England than in the South or Middle 
Atlantic. By the 1660s, as established settlements grew more crowded, land dis-
putes increased due to overlapping grants, claims, and a diminishing ability to 
simply spread out.177 Because their records were as haphazard as their surveys, 
colonists developed the practice of calling one another to testify about pur-
chases that had they had made several decades earlier as proof of title, and rec-
orded retroactive quitclaim deeds based on such testimony.178 The town of And-
over, MA, for example, tried settle disputes over land by appointing townsmen 
to investigate and record transactions “to be esteemed and accounted as valid 
and authentick, as if they had been entered and recorded at the time when they 
were graunted, though the day and year of such graunts be not mentioned nor 
remembered.”179  
Questions about the legitimacy and validity of different colonial charters, 
as well as colonists’ claims vis-à-vis Native groups, lingered through the seven-
teenth century. The chains of title that colonists constructed from title became 
increasingly important for them to confirm their own title claims against one 
another as well as Native groups. When Governor Edmund Andros of the Do-
minion of New England, for example, sought in 1686 to reverse previously set-
tled policy by invalidating all titles that could not be traced back to government 
grant, he caused a “storm of protest” from New Englanders, some of whom de-
clared that  if purchase from Indians could not serve as the root of a valid land 
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title, “no Man was owner of a Foot of Land in all the Colony.”180 Each New 
England coastal town subsequently sought to negotiate retroactive “quitclaim 
deeds” with “known” descendants of the Native leaders who were contemporar-
ies of the first settlers, to ensure they had extinguished Native title on the rec-
ord.181 Meanwhile, rectangular surveys grew increasingly common, though col-
onists were not able to actualize a large-scale, systematic survey across a 
colony182; nonetheless, they devised several such plans, one of the most notable 
of which emerged from the Carolinas while John Locke was the unofficial sec-
retary for the Lord Proprietors, which recognized that “the whole foundation of 
the government is settled upon a right and equall distribution of Land, and the 
orderly takeing of it up is of great moment to the welfare of the Province.”183  
To construct these chains of title, these early title disputes inspired the con-
solidation of records that is now a hallmark of the Anglo-American property 
system and that has distinguished it since this time from the English system. 184  
The innovation of comprehensive title registration was a technological solution 
that helped solve the legitimacy questions and need to process and trade land as 
it became the preeminent colonial commodity in a land market of scale, inten-
sity, and liquidity theretofore unknown in England. As James Willard Hurst, the 
father of American legal history noted, though many colonies had adopted Eng-
lish practices of protecting estates from easy alienation, such as entail and pri-
mogeniture,185 “the seventeenth-century beginnings of the recording act system 
expressed our early interest in turning land into a more readily transferable 
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good.”186  Likewise, when the newly formed United States looked to the west-
ern lands as its primary asset from a position of bankruptcy, it recognized the 
need for a record-keeping system and a comprehensive survey in order to 
quickly absorb lands, after expropriation, into the market it thereby created. 
Thus, when Congress created a policy for “orderly disposal of the new public 
domain,” it drew from the New England system of survey before settlement and 
models of administration utilizing a central land office and registers from Vir-
ginia.187 The meridians that formed the basis of outlines for states and town-
ships in Jefferson’s plan took their cue from colonial charters that followed 
north-south directions, or parallels of latitude.188  
In short, the fundamental elements of the land system—the comprehensive 
title registry, and the rectangular survey as a method of creating individual en-
closures as well as state and local jurisdictions-- grew out of these efforts to 
take possession of Native nations’ lands. Indeed, Locke’s descriptions of “im-
proving,” “cultivating,” and “enclosing” land are vague and capacious enough 
to encompass this labor of property production-- measuring and mapping land 
to prepare it for market, as well as consolidating this information to facilitate 
market transactions. These efforts, as described above, only became necessary 
as the colonial population burgeoned in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries in two notable ways and with it, its engrossment of lands. This population, 
however, did not grow of its own accord. On the one hand, travel to distant, 
strange lands ruled by powerful nations with the intent to extract and make 
claims to resources there was a daunting and dangerous venture.189 The waves 
of migration that “peopled North America” were engineered by headright, or 
homesteading land grant laws that left a lasting imprint on the property system, 
and that for colonial governments and companies, killed several birds with one 
stone—encouraging immigration to, producing property in, and removing Na-
tive people from the lands. On the other, colonists built a labor force to culti-
vate the lands they thereby expropriated through the importation of captive Af-
ricans whom they enslaved, using laws to render this population another major 
form of property and to racialize slavery in a way that has permanently marked 
the social order of the nation. 
The earliest use of headrights was in Virginia under Sir Thomas Dale’s ad-
ministration, which promised every man with a family to come to the colony 
 
186 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 12 (1956). 
187 MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837 7 (1968). See generally Ford, 
supra n. 187 (in the early surveys of the New England town commons and of the river lands 
everywhere, is found the germ of the modern rectangular system.”).  
188 Ford, supra note 183, at 10. 
189 Park, supra note 21, at 81; BERNARD BAILYN, PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 
81 (1986). 
2015  43 
 
twelve acres and a house in 1614. Colonies across the eastern seaboard found it 
virtually impossible to recruit populations for their settlements until they 
adopted some variation of the headright system.190 The headright laws placed 
conditions on land grants that included agricultural activity—Locke’s “tilling” 
and “planting.”191 To “consummate” their title, in parallel logic to the two-step 
discovery rule, settlers had to clear, cultivate, occupy, and defend a certain 
amount of land over a term of years. In Virginia, for example, a settler had to 
build a house, plant one acre, and keep stock for one year, within three years, or 
risking forfeiting the land; in Massachusetts, settlers had to “take actual posses-
sion” and build a house of certain size and clear five to eight acres fit for 
“mowing and tilling.”192  
The headright laws worked to accomplish the goal of removal in several 
ways. First, actual occupation, guided by the requirements of land grants and 
ordered by government had the effects, as Eric Kades and others have observed, 
of spreading disease and chasing away game. The ways that settlement made 
life more difficult for Native people, in turn, made it easier for private individu-
als and governments to purchase land from them: “A native population deci-
mated by sickness and deprived of sources of food and other necessities had lit-
tle bargaining power. The title of occupancy went for a pittance.”193 Further, 
colonies made larger land grants to men “able to defend it, and in this way to 
secure protection without the expense of a standing army.” Men who brought 
military-aged men ready for combat and who served in wars against Native na-
tions received especially large grants.194 Even before the Revolutionary War 
had ended, at least three states adopted headright systems to help populate their 
“back country”—Virginia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts, which offered 
settlers 100 acres on the sole condition of clearing sixteen acres in four 
years.”195 Like the basic elements of the land system, the United States adopted 
the strategy of incentivizing settlement with promises of land as well, though at 
a price, to help it extinguish Native title in western territories.196 The legislation 
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Congress passed to achieve these ends includes the famous Homestead Act of 
1862, as well as a string of predecessor and progeny legislation.197  
All of the colonies developed some dependence on enslaved Africans to la-
bor on the lands they so rapidly sought to expropriate, although nowhere so 
great as in the South. About 600,000 of the 12 million Africans taken into cap-
tivity for the transatlantic slave trade were brought to mainland America. The 
laws colonies passed with respect to this labor force created a new, emphati-
cally racial form of property in perpetually enslaved humans that disengaged 
the condition of enslavement from the Christian mission of discovery. Notwith-
standing references to the origin of the slave trade in theories of Christian just 
war, Virginia passed a law providing that baptism could not affect the bondage 
of Black or Native people in 1667, ensuring that “the skin color and not the 
heathenism of their black and Indian slaves… ‘justified’ their subjugation.”198  
Other laws ensured the racial, hereditary, and perpetual nature of enslave-
ment in America by tying it to kinship and segregation in ways that, as Jennifer 
Morgan has written, “legally completed” the association between blackness and 
forced labor.199 Colonies dictated that free-born women who married an en-
slaved person would also be enslaved during their husbands’ lifetime, and that 
the children born within such marriages would be slaves for life. In 1662, Vir-
ginia passed a law stating that “all children borne in this country shalbe held 
bond or free only according to the condition of the mother, ”200 contravening 
the English common-law rule that status followed the condition of the father. 
This rule of Partus sequitur ventrem—literally, “off-spring follows the womb”-
- became a governing principle of property across the colonies, and ascended to 
paramount importance in the U.S. domestic slave trade after the importation of 
enslaved Africans was abolished in 1808 and the rape of Black women became 
a key means of property increase. The Virginia judge James Gholson, speaking 
to the state legislature in 1831, saw the rule as crucial enough to claim that 
“‘Partus sequitur ventrem’ is coeval with the existence of the right of property 
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itself.”201 The “equation of black skin with the potential for enslavement,” Bar-
bara Holden-Smith observes, also meant that before abolition, “free blacks in 
both the North and the South lived under constant threat of being kidnapped 
and sold into slavery.”202 
The racial hierarchy of discovery that underpinned the colonial enterprise 
as a whole acquired its strongest elaboration through the development of this 
institution-- its laws, its practices, and the lived experiences and relationships 
that it spawned. That is, the specific ideological content of that racial hierarchy 
was not prescribed by the Discovery Doctrine—it evolved through enslave-
ment, as well as through the labor theory, as we have already seen, and also col-
onists’ practices on the ground, of transacting with non-white groups very dif-
ferently than with one another.203 These forms of legal debasement, key to the 
construction of Black laborers as property in contradistinction to white serv-
ants, helped evolve an anti-blackness that affected free as well as enslaved 
Black people, and also influenced evolving colonial racial ideas about Native 
people.204 Non-whites were increasingly grouped together in colonial racial le-
gal codes that limited the mobility of non-whites, along with their freedom of 
assembly, freedom to bear arms, and capacities in court, among other things.205  
An evolving set of debates about how to treat property in enslaved people 
and expropriated lands also helped to transform and liquify the already unprece-
dentedly commodified colonial land market, undermining an ancient distinction 
between real and chattel property in English property law in the process. For 
centuries, English property law regarded land and moveable goods as essen-
tially unlike, due to land’s unique characteristics of sustaining life, and the chal-
lenges of designating its features, such as rivers, lakes, forests, and shorelines, 
as the private property of an individual rather than as a common good. Under 
that ancient distinction, chattel property, but not real property, was liable to sei-
zure for the nonpayment of debts.206 However, the protection of large estates 
 
201 DAINA RAMEY BERRY, THE PRICE FOR THEIR POUND OF FLESH: THE VALUE OF THE 
ENSLAVED, FROM WOMB TO GRAVE, IN THE BUILDING OF A NATION 11 (2017). 
202 Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery, and Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1993). 
203 See Park, supra note 109. 
204 Nancy Shoemaker observes, English stereotypes about Native people’s inferiority did 
not congeal in emphatically racial terms until the eighteenth century. See generally, Shoe-
maker, supra note 109. I argue that racially differentiated legal practices preceded this ideo-
logical formation, suggesting that racial practices can contribute to the dynamic process of 
racial ideological formation. Park, supra note 109.  
205 Higginbotham, supra note 141, at 39-41, 76-82. 
206 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 201 (1766); Claire 
Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and its Limits in American His-
tory, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006); K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of 
America, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1006, 1007-1008 (2016).   




from foreclosure made it possible for debtors to conceal enslaved persons from 
their creditors on their land. Further, the value of land and the labor of enslaved 
people were interdependent in the colonies, since each of these assets became 
useless for the enterprise without the other.  
The attempt to keep plantations whole led to debates about the proper legal 
category for enslaved Black people and experiments in treating them both as 
chattel-- the legal equivalent of cattle, sheep, and horses-- and distinguishing 
them from that category by treating them as real estate instead. Because prop-
erty in enslaved people was so valuable and constituted such a huge part of peo-
ple’s assets,207 several colonies used the real property designation to protect 
property in people from the rules governing chattel property. South Carolina, 
for example, tried to characterize slaves as real estate in 1690, following Barba-
dos, but the English Privy Council would not permit it; Virginia, Louisiana, 
Kentucky and Arkansas all designated enslaved persons as realty between 1705 
and 1852. As Thomas Morris notes, “rules of real property law were applied to 
slaves in some instances in over one-third of the jurisdictions that made up the 
slave South.”208 As the Virginia jurist St. George Tucker of Virginia stated,  
the incidents to real and personal property, respectively, are merely crea-
tures of the juris positive, or ordinary rules of law concerning them; and 
may be altered and changed to suit the circumstances, convenience, inter-
est, and advantages of society… Thus in England it might be for the bene-
fit of commerce to consider a lease for a thousand years, in lands, as a 
mere chattel; and in Virginia it might have been equally for the advantage 
of agriculture to consider the slave who cultivated the land as real estate.209  
 
While these experiments underscore the malleability and function of legal cate-
gories, applying the protections of real estate to enslaved people highly frus-
trated planters’ creditors, who lobbied for the opposite conflation—to make 
lands, as well as enslaved persons, liable for unsecured debts in the colonies. At 
creditors’ behest, colonies, beginning in the northeast, began to adopt laws 
abandoning the ancient protections of lands from foreclosure,210 likely encour-
aged by the fact that colonists had already normalized easy foreclosure in trans-
actions with Native people for land for decades.211 Finally, after lobbying from 
the biggest independent slave traders in England, Parliament made lands, as 
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well as enslaved persons, liable for nonpayment of debts across the British col-
onies with the Debt Recovery Act in 1732.212 Following the passage of this Act, 
transfers of land accelerated, slave auctions became more frequent, and access 
to credit flooded the colonial market. In other words, during the colonial period, 
property laws transformed to make it easier to seize both land and enslaved 
people like chattel for unpaid debts in unprecedented ways.  
This breakdown of the ancient distinction between real and chattel prop-
erty during the colonial period-- with the development of the comprehensive 
survey and title registry, and in the context of the collective effort to exclude 
Native and African claims to their lands and bodies-- ushered in novel under-
standings of property that are so naturalized today that they largely escape scru-
tiny. The principle of “discovery,” and the conception of “unlimited” land there 
for the taking did not guide the creation of the land system in England; the en-
closure of common fields was a relatively new development there at the time; 
England is only undertaking the compilation of a comprehensive land registry 
now and the project remains incomplete; and though mortgages were common, 
failure to pay debts resulted in divisions of interests that no longer exist in the 
same way, such as the owner’s loss of usufructual rights, or the right of a lender 
to take possession of a property and harvest the fruits and rents of land.213 
These elements made a measure of land to clearly define the enclosure as a 
commodity; centralizing and publicizing information concerning that commod-
ity facilitated its trade. While the ideas of boundaries themselves were not 
new,214 enclosures evolved in America to serve the novel idea that “individuals 
possess all the resources within a given area of land.”215 Above all, the mort-
gage converted that commodity into an access point for a stream of credit to 
build the colonial economy, while making the power to expel people from the 
land, to seize homes to satisfy debts, a key mechanism of that credit system, 
without which credit and the growth it fed would grind to a halt.  
In other words, this new system evolved to quickly process resources for 
their potential to yield monetary profits and open credit streams, not to preserve 
homelands, nor create a society that prioritized stability in the conditions that 
support life. It was successful in its goals, and relentless in exploiting the re-
sources it took to be expendable—people’s basic needs. Its effectiveness at con-
verting the resources extracted by conquest into monetary value generated an 
unprecedented and voracious market, encouraging colonial and state govern-
ments, and finally the United States, bankrupt after the Revolutionary War, to 
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view the sale of “wild lands” as their greatest source of revenue.216 Perhaps it is 
self-evident that the production and regulation of the most reliably valuable as-
sets on this market-- lands and people—would become a major priority, preoc-
cupation, and source of conflict for colonial and state governments and the 
United States, in ways that had a lasting effect on law and legal institutions, not 
to mention the nation’s political, social and economic life. Many changes and 
trends built on those that I have described from the colonial era: by 1846, sev-
eral advocates at the NY Constitutional Convention comfortably argued that 
“there should be no more restrictions placed upon alienation of real estate than 
upon personal estate. Property was improved by passing from hand to 
hand…”217 Hurst describes how in the nineteenth century, “we began to remove 
such feudal restrictions on alienation as we had suffered and to build up the in-
tricate body of law concerning the recording acts and the title problems invoved 
in the finance of land trading.”218 While discussing “the enthusiastic nineteenth 
century expansion of contract,” he further proclaimed that “[t]he first and most 
dramatic victory of contract was its capture of the land,” adding, in an echo of 
the labor theory, that “the sheer abundance of land was probably enough to as-
sure that a static, feudal type of tenure could not take lasting root with us.”219  
C. Possession by Dispossession  
The theory of “possession” focuses a question that has underpinned the en-
tire foregoing analysis and also a central question of modern law: the way the 
law organizes the state’s monopoly on force. The well-known maxim that “pos-
session is nine-tenths of the law” addresses this relationship by acknowledging 
that it requires an undesirable degree of force to take possession away from 
someone and grant it to someone else; the ancient Roman law of uti possidetis 
(“as you possess, you may continue to possess”) too expresses a strong prefer-
ence for stability. In U.S. law, however, taking “possession” was the consum-
mating condition for claiming title by conquest. Efforts to take possession of 
the continent in this context flip the ancient priority of maintaining the status 
quo on its head.220 As Hurst observed, in the United States, “We did not devote 
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the prime energies of our legal growth to protecting those who sought the law’s 
shelter simply for what they had”; “our enthusiasm ran rather to those who 
wanted the law’s help positively to bring things about.”221 Aziz Rana has called 
the identity of the projects of conquest and nation-building “the two faces of 
American freedom.”222 Similarly, Richard Hildreth took stock of the oppositely 
charged ways that Americans understood their country in 1840, when, reflect-
ing on chattel slavery, he called the American Republic an experiment in racial 
despotism as much as in democracy.223  
This article suggests that the glue between the two faces of American free-
dom is the legal practices and institutions that Anglo-americans created—to 
both extract resources from prior possessors and reconstitute them as property, 
for example. The principle of possession in U.S. law selectively applied the law 
to recognize whites’ possession, but not Native or Black people’s. Beyond this 
inequity, however, the centuries-long, concerted effort to take possession of the 
continent and dispossess others had a significant impact on the development of 
the laws and institutions that facilitated that process. To accomplish these goals, 
the laws mobilized, guided, and sanctioned force to a degree neither known or 
necessary in contexts where the aim of governance was to maintain the status 
quo. This section illustrates the specific ways that laws organized force for the 
twin processes of dispossession and taking possession by first, returning to the 
example of headrights or land grants, and second, turning to the enslaved per-
sons’ flights to freedom and the “fugitive slave” controversy. As I show, the 
state had no capacity to take direct responsibility for the force required to create 
and maintain the two principal genres of property in early America—land and 
human beings-- resulting in innovative structures of governance. With promises 
to back private claims to ownership and wealth, the state guided a diffusion of 
force that came to permeate and animate private life, as well as governance. 
This approach to building a nation and its markets generated lasting norms 
about the role of law and violence in society, evidenced in legal disputes that 
pitted one community’s ancestral homelands against another’s real estate mar-
ket, and human freedom against a fearfully powerful new right to property in 
the United States.   
1. The Headright or Homesteading Principle: Conquest by Settlement 
As with other elements of the property system, the United States adopted 
the colonial method of incentivizing settlement with headrights or land grants to 
take possession of western territories. This approach accomplished the goals it 
served in the colonies-- recruiting population to occupy lands, removing Native 
people from those lands, and converting those lands into property—and also, 
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creating revenue for the federal government, which was $54 million in debt at 
the end of the Revolutionary War.224  Though the western landswere still ruled 
by powerful Native nations, early statesmen anticipated that “a rich and fertile 
country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon 
become national stock.” Further, they understood that because the process of 
taking possession of this territory would involve violence, that “Indian hostili-
ties… would always be at hand.”225 The legal approach the government took to 
conquest, as in the colonies, outsourced a large degree of this violence to pri-
vate parties, especially squatters.226 For the next century, settlers consequently 
moved into Indian Country, often ahead of the survey, to take possession of 
lands against Native nations’ claims, believing that the federal government had 
authorized them in activity they knew, by the same token, to be “extra-legal.”227 
As Hurst wrote, “we loaned the organized force of the community to private 
planners,”228 ensuring “the central place of the modern institution of private 
property in our politics as well as in our economic organization,”229 and that 
“the challenge of the unopened continent dominated our imagination.”230  
After the Revolutionary War, the United States claimed vast territories 
ceded by Britain under the Treaty of Paris, but exerted no actual control over 
the region. “[T]he impoverished, ill-armed United States did not have the 
means to carry out the policy of force that it had adopted”231 to remove Native 
people from their homelands; and when the Continental Congress considered 
how to pay soldiers and generate revenue from the lands it sought to claim in 
1783, it admitted that “the public finances do not admit of any considerable ex-
penditure to extinguish Indian claims upon such lands.”232 Secretary of War 
 
224 See e.g. Reginald Horsman, The Indian Policy of an Empire for Liberty, in NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 38 (Frederick E. Hoxie et al. ed., 1999); see also 
DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN AND WHITE SAVAGES 88 (2008). K-Sue Park, 
Insuring Conquest: U.S. Expansion and the Indian Depredation Claims System, 1796-1920, 
8 HIST. PRESENT 57, 65 (2018).  
225 THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
226 Park, supra note 224, at 59. 
227 BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1924). 
228 Hurst called this the “release of energy” approach.” Hurst, supra note 186, at 10-11. 
229 Id. at 2. 
230 Id. at 8. 
231 REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY 38 (1999). Secretary of War Henry 
Knox calculated that it would require 2500 to 3000 men each year, and at least $2 million 
over two years, without accounting for losses in lives, property and abandonment of the 
frontiers. By contrast, a policy of managing Indian relations would be only $15,000/year for 
fifty years. Banner, supra note 7, at 130-131.  
232 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 25: 682-83; see also Hibbard, 
supra note 227, at 32-33; Park, supra note 224, at 65. 
2015  51 
 
Henry Knox, following a view expressed by none other than George Washing-
ton, among others, recommended that the nation adopt the tried and tested 
method of settlement, rather than a military campaign; referencing the ways set-
tlers had spread disease and chased away game to effect Native removal, Knox 
advised that “it is most probable that the Indians will, by the invariable opera-
tion of the causes which have hitherto existed in their intercourse with the 
whites, be reduced to a very small number.”233 Though the federal government 
disbursed land grants to Revolutionary War soldiers, and continued to make 
land grants for military services in the borderlands during the period of the 
early Republic,234 unlike colonies, it planned to sell the lands to settlers and 
thereby make the territories a source of national revenue to deal with its exten-
sive debts. As Ablavsky writes, “These western lands became the new nation’s 
arguably most valuable asset: cheap now, they promised to rise inexorably in 
value as Anglo-Americans migrated west.”235 
The Trade and Intercourse Acts, a series of legislation passed in 1790, 
1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1836, made the federal government the only entity 
that could acquire Native nations’ lands—as we saw above, by purchase or con-
quest—and it became the middle point for transfer from Native nations and dis-
tribution to private entities. In order to manage this role, the government estab-
lished a federal land system, including a U.S. Surveyor General’s Office and 
Land Offices to receive and affirm settlers’ claims. The federal government’s 
prerogative to acquire lands meant that prospective private purchasers-- settlers, 
squatters and speculators alike-- had to wait to formally buy land. In practice, 
they did not wait for this formality to enter onto tribal lands: as Andro Linklater 
writes, “[t]he race that developed between surveyors and squatters marked the 
entire history of the land survey, and it was rare for a surveying team to meas-
ure productive country that had no settlers at all.”236  
Settlers’ first efforts to take actual possession of lands, as Knox and others 
foresaw, made life less tenable for Native nations and facilitated the federal 
government’s ability to negotiate with them for a cheap price. While in difficult 
diplomatic situations, the government punished settlers for their incursions, in 
many other instances, they turned a blind eye and confirmed settlers’ claims. As 
a result, just as the colonies relied on settlers to “form a rough, ready, and cheap 
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border militia,” settlers provided the front-line for the United States’ territorial 
expansion.237 Understanding their own position, they spread into Indian Coun-
try aggressively to pressure the federal government into purchasing the lands.238 
Banner notes that “[s]ettlers on the frontier knew very well that initiating con-
flict with the Indians was the surest way to prod the federal government to buy 
the Indians’ land”; an emissary to the federal government complained that in 
the Georgia borderlands, settlers’ rallying cry had become “let us kill the Indi-
ans, bring on a war, and we shall get land.”239 
Many government officials described the consequent violence in the bor-
derlands as the result of troublesome “banditti” and “rabble” on both sides.240 
This characterization does not acknowledge the extent to which the federal gov-
ernment encouraged, tolerated or acquiesced in, and benefited from settlers’ ac-
tivities. By 1785, it had already become conventional wisdom that the federal 
government should purchase land “as fast as Americans could settle on” it, with 
the rationale of preventing war, causing  Secretary of State Timothy Pickering 
to point out that this logic of expansion had no limit, and to ask pointedly, 
“where shall we stop?”241 However, under this arrangement, the government 
not only preserved federal dollars by not paying a formal military force to take 
the lands, but also maintained a position of formal diplomacy towards tribes.242 
The apparent independence of settlers’ violence left the government free to pur-
sue an overt policy of conciliation for most of the nineteenth century.243  
For their part, settlers understood themselves as acting at the behest of the 
federal government. In 1836, the Pike River Claimants Union, comprised of 
settlers who knowingly settled outside the bounds of formally acquired terri-
tory, adopted a constitution for themselves, in which they explicitly expressed 
their understanding and belief that they had done so in keeping with govern-
ment’s wishes: “as the Government has heretofore encouraged emigration by 
granting pre-emption to actual settlers, we are assured that our settling and cul-
tivating the public lands is in accordance with the best wishes of Government.” 
Stressing their sacrifices and labor, they “solemnly pledged” to protect each 
others’ “just rights.” Hurst opened his most famous book with this statement to 
protest the depiction of “lawless” settlers as “too glib a characterization.” Hurst 
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emphasized settlers’ embrace of and demand for legal order: for him, the con-
victions of claimants unions reflected “working principles by which we orga-
nized the relations of legal order and social order in the nineteenth century 
United States,” which he called “the release-of-energy policy.” 244 Indeed, in 
keeping with the “two faces” model, settlers did understand themselves as 
bringing law to the territory-- as “resident militia,” who “served in the field 
without compensation and at their own expense,”245 and the frontline of a new 
jurisdiction on its way. 
For decades, the federal government evaded settlers’ claims that it had en-
couraged and incentivized their encroachment into others’ lands.246 However, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, with the territories largely under their actual 
control, it began to explicitly celebrate their actions in ways that have become a 
part of the national mythology. In 1886, for example, the House Committee on 
Indian Affairs declared that  
The early pioneers in the far West, the makers of a new civilization, the 
founders of a great empire, the leaders in the great army of workers who 
have made the vast western wilderness blossom with rich harvests, are 
among the noblest heroes and greatest benefactors of this Republic, and 
deserve from a grateful country an ample recognition of their trials and pri-
vations. It is difficult for one who has not taken part in that stupendous 
work to realize the labor of these early pioneers.247 
 
The context of this statement, ironically, was one in which the federal govern-
ment closed the door on many of those settlers’ formal claims for compensation 
for the losses they incurred on the frontier. For decades, they had pursued these 
claims precisely by arguing that they had served at the government’s behest. 
The structure of private incentives that the government deployed, however, cre-
ated enough space between settlers’ formal petitions for indemnity and the gov-
ernment’s public declarations that the latter could alternately disavow, tacitly 
endorse, or openly praise the racial violence of conquest. These mixed senti-
ments swirled around a legal structure that, in not conforming to traditions of 
occupation by direct command, made a satisfying answer impossible to the 
question of whether the government bore responsibility for the racial rage that 
fueled occupation and conquest, or whether it did not. 
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Settlers’ labor was multivalent—it consisted of nation-building, property 
creation, and the racial violence of Native removal. Settlers driven by the prom-
ise that the government would validate their private property claims helped 
bring new jurisdictions into existence. The force they deployed to take lands 
from Native nations, who fiercely resisted their encroachment, made the fron-
tier a great space of racial violence. Because of the government’s legal ap-
proach to conquest, however, this violence did not have the character of a for-
mal military occupation. Instead, it manifested as private racial violence, 
steeped in all the prejudices and affects of interpersonal relationships. The strat-
egy of conquest cultivated, among other things, an aggrieved population of set-
tlers who, often feeling abandoned and left without protection by the state, nev-
ertheless found their identity in their alignment with it and the racial war they 
believed it directed, and vented their rage upon those in possession of the lands 
in which they believed their future worth lay. 
2. Property Against the Self-Possession of Human-Beings 
The great contradiction of the American chattel slave trade— the fact that a 
person remained a person, though treated by law as property—generated an en-
tire infrastructure of law that sharply focuses the questions of possession and 
the relationship between the law and force. The effort to elevate the property 
value above the human value of an enslaved person manifested in a wide vari-
ety of laws that sanctioned slaveholders and other whites’ violence against and 
sexual abuse of that individual. In general, under laws regulating slavery, slave-
holders had “the unlimited right to abuse their slaves to any extreme of brutality 
and wantonness as long as the slave survived,”248 and third parties had battery 
rights with limitations.249 In the case of death, while colonial laws generally that 
such killings were not punishable as murder,250 U.S. states recognized them as 
homicide unless they occurred in the commission of the highly malleable ex-
ception called a “moderate correction.”251 In State v. Mann, Judge Ruffin called 
“full dominion of the owner over the slave… essential to the value of slaves as 
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property, to the security of the master, and the public tranquility, greatly de-
pendent upon their subordination.”252  
In short, Anglo-americans laws sanctioned and directed enormous violence 
toward the effort to control people as property. This section examines the spe-
cific controversy over enslaved people’s flight from captivity as perhaps the 
clearest illustration of this violence and the extent to which a person, despite all 
efforts to deny it, remained in possession of herself. For that reason, from the 
beginning, people’s determination to escape bondage profoundly destabilized 
the institution of slavery itself.253 The central issue of fugitivity was possession 
on both sides: people’s self-reclamation subverted slaveholders’ “uncontrolled 
authority over the body”—their possession.254 Slavery pitted people’s self pos-
session against slave owners’ possession of them, that is, so that one person’s 
liberty confronted another’s property right. As Peter Wood wrote, “[n]o single 
act of self-assertion was more significant among slaves or more disconcerting 
among whites than that of running away… these were the people who, in a real 
sense, elected to ‘steal themselves.’”255 The effort to defy the persistent fact of 
personhood produced shows of force that no matter how constant and over-
whelming, proved inadequate to an impossible task, frustrating both slavehold-
ers and the very institution of slavery.   
There was no period of the slave trade that slaveholders did not use law to 
organize the force of the state to protect their rights to property in people 
against fugitivity. As C.W.A. David wrote in 1924, “Almost immediately after 
the introduction of slavery we find that its horrors led to so many runaways that 
colonial laws relating to fugitive slaves had to be enacted”256; various laws 
commanded private persons to capture any enslaved person they found travel-
ing without a pass.257 Perhaps because of this common law heritage, the Fugi-
tive Slave Clause of the Constitution was adopted without event.258 However, 
by the time of the Constitutional Convention, the sectional divide between the 
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states on the issue of slavery was clear.259 Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylva-
nia, and New Hampshire all abolished slavery between 1777 and 1784.260 Fur-
ther, the stakes of the trade had had grown: by 1774, the value of property in 
human beings held across the colonies was over £21 million, 261 the equivalent 
of almost $3.2 billion today. During the Revolutionary era, the number of peo-
ple who escaped and sued their enslavers for freedom increased dramatically262; 
groups of enslaved people in New England organized antislavery committees 
and disseminated Black freedom petitions with the help of white abolition-
ists.263 One runaway ad placed in Virginia in 1773 complains that the imagina-
tion of freedom “a Notion now too prevalent among the Negroes, greatly to the 
Vexation and Prejudice of their Masters.”264  
In response to a controversy arising from the abduction of John Davis from 
Pennsylvania to Virginia, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, 
which authorized a slaveholder or “his agent or attorney” to “seize the fugitive” 
and seek a certificate for removal from a judge or magistrate.265 Because the 
1793 Act provided no penalties for false claims, slave catchers found it simple 
to procure removal certificates for free as well as escaped Black people. As 
Barbara Holden-Smith comments, the Act “proved to be an inadequate solution 
to the conflict over the return of fugitive slaves, and it did nothing to deal with 
the problem of the kidnapping of free blacks.” Kidnappings in the North subse-
quently increased, perhaps also fueled by new pressures from the prohibition on 
the transatlantic trade in 1807 and the establishment of new cotton plantations 
in the Old Southwest.266 The free states became “one vast hunting ground” as 
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slave catchers roamed them “to reclaim runaway slaves but also to kidnap free 
blacks to sell into bondage in the South,” using both force and trickery.267  
In response, many free state governments passed “Personal Liberty Laws” 
to supplement the Act with both protections for Black people against kidnap-
ping and state assistance for slave catchers who complied with the state’s pro-
cedures.268 Pennsylvania, a free state bordered by three slave states tried repeat-
edly to address kidnapping.269  In 1826, it required Southern claimants to apply 
to a judge, justice of the peace, or alderman for an arrest warrant, and to pro-
duce evidence other than their own affidavits to verify claims; several other 
northern states followed with more and less protective provisions.270 In the cir-
cumstances that led to Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Margaret Morgan, who had lived 
with her parents in practical, if not formal freedom for her entire life, eventually 
married a free man from Pennsylvania, where she then moved with him and 
their children and had at least one more child. After her formal slaveholder 
died, his niece and heiress hired “four prominent Maryland citizens,” including 
Edward Prigg, to seize Mrs. Morgan. Since the justice of the peace from whom 
they sought a certificate of removal “refused to take further cognizance of the 
case,” they forcibly took her and all her children back to Maryland and into 
slavery, in violation of Pennsylvania law.271 When the dispute reached the Su-
preme Court, in a robust assertion of national power, Story found Pennsylva-
nia’s law preempted by the 1793 Act.272 Further, he extolled property rights,  he 
held as sacred above all other rights, and referred to the “possession” or “repos-
session” of a person such as Margaret Morgan as property twenty-two times in 
his discussion of the interests at stake.273 As Holden-Smith argued, Story, who 
never mentioned the problem of kidnapping,  “subordinated the claims of black 
people to human dignity to the claims of slaveholders to their property.”274  
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The Court’s decision in Prigg, however, also structurally changed the law 
of capture: by giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the fu-
gitive slave problem, Gautham Rao observes, it absolved the states of any en-
forcement burdens and “forced slaveholders to drastically reframe their ap-
proach to the problem of fugitive slaves.”275 As the Justices acknowledged, the 
federal government had no capacity to marshall the force required for this scale 
of “property protection” or dispossession; the remoteness of the federal govern-
ment and its lack of manpower, Roger Taney decried, would render the 1793 
law “ineffectual and delusive” without help from the states.276 The solution the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 eventually devised to resolve this problem also 
looked to the tradition of private informal militias and the tradition of the posse 
comitatus277: it enstated a federal posse comitatus law in its command to “all 
good citizens… to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this 
law.” Section 9 focuses on the force required to dispossess the fugitive, ac-
knowledging “reason to apprehend that such fugitive will be rescued by force 
from his or their possession”; it not only authorized but required the officer 
overseeing the capture to “employ so many persons as he may deem neces-
sary… to overcome such force,” to be paid from the U.S. Treasury. 278 At least 
one source estimates that slaveowners succeeded in about 80 per cent of their 
attempts to repossess persons under the new Act.279 Still, before and after the 
Act of 1850, slaveholders built their own private enforcement power through 
local protective associations that organized “pursuing committees,” recapture 
and reward funds, and “a force of agents” to find fugitives who crossed state 
lines and supplement local police forces. These types of unions for claims also 
resulted in great violence, pitting neighbors against neighbors, and prompting 
raids and shootouts, as well as kidnappings, especially in the borderlands, 
which R.J.M. Blackett has called “zones of maximum conflict.”280 
The extensive private mobilization and organizing on the other side of this 
struggle is well known as the Underground Railroad, a network of sites of inter-
racial abolitionist organizing in parts of Ohio, south-central Pennsylvania and 
Philadelphia, upstate New York and New York City, the area around the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the port cities of New Bedford and Boston, Detroit, western 
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Illinois, black settlements in Canada and free black communities in border slave 
states and the northwest.281 Like well-known luminaries such as Harriet Tub-
man, Frederick Douglass, and Sojourner Truth, many who “self-emancipated” 
by flight joined the abolition movement to help lead it with their advocacy, 
writings, and by undertaking the perilous risks of “running slaves.” The number 
of people who escaped enslavement is difficult to know for certain, but in her 
recent account of the abolition movement, Manisha Sinha cites a contemporary 
estimate of 150,000 persons between 1830 and 1860.282 For a sense of propor-
tion, between 1790 and abolition, the population of enslaved people grew by 
about 580%, from about 700,000 to almost 4 million people. During this period, 
the abolitionist movement was organizing powerfully, nationwide and also in-
ternationally, not only for an end to enslavement but for citizenship, enfran-
chisement, and equality, insisting, “WE ARE AMERICANS.”283 Against this 
backdrop, the Missouri Republican alone ran ads showing an annual average of 
40 people escaping their enslavers between 1851 and 1860; similar ads in Rich-
mond newspapers during that time indicated an annual average of 70 escapes.284 
Abolitionists, highly conscious of slaveholders’ invocation of property 
rights, resolved to refuse it in absolute terms, to the point of criticizing 
Douglass’ purchase of his own freedom with British funds. William Lloyd Gar-
rison, insisting that enslaved people’s efforts to purchase their own and their 
family’s liberation could not be called compensation to slaveholders, rather 
called the money a “ransom.”285 Self-emancipated people, in the literature they 
produced, frequently referenced and repurposed familiar property theories. 
Henry Bibb, who escaped to freedom in 1841 and published his narrative in 
1849, invoked the labor theory when he asked “who had a better right to eat the 
fruits of my own hard earnings than myself?”286 William Wells Brown, who es-
caped in 1834 and published his story in 1847, pointed to his own dispossession 
when he called his master “the man who stole me as soon as I was born.”287 
James W.C. Pennington, who escaped slavery at the age of 19 in 1827, and be-
came the first Black student at Yale and published the first history of Black 
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people in the United States,288 in his narrative of escape resoundingly de-
nounced the “chattel principle” that reduced human beings to marketable com-
modities as the essence of slavery.289  
 All this evidence of self-possession was most galling to slaveholders, 
whose own right to possession it directly challenged. For this reason, they spun 
narratives in response that “refused to acknowledge among runaways signs of 
rationality, emotion, and independence, which they hoped to both ignore and 
suppress” 290 : they blamed white “negro stealers,” “unnamed white men,” and 
“thieving Abolitionists” for their losses,291 widely blamed white abolitionists 
were leading and inspiring fugitives, rather than the reverse,292 and claimed that 
Douglass could not possibly have been enslaved.293 An 1851 cartoon by the 
Philadelphia lawyer and artist Edward Williams Clay, who specialized in pro-
slavery political illustrations, is typically demeaning and insists that the issue is 
possession of property: its first panel depicts a slaveholder and federal marshal 
invoking U.S. law to confront a white abolitionist, with a fugitive enslaved per-
son cowering behind him, while the second shows the same abolitionist point-
ing to stolen cloth in the shop of the slaveholder, who responds with regard to 
the cloth: “They are fugitives from you, are they?… I have a higher law of my 
own, and possession is nine points in the law”294; the enslaved person agrees: 
“Of course Massa. De dam Bobolitionist is de wus enemy we poor n***s have 
got.”295 The law lent its force to this narrative in charging white abolitionists 
with dispossession: 1854, for example, Kentucky governor Lazarus Powell de-
manded the return of enslaved persons from Indiana governor Joseph Wright, 
and charged white abolitionist Delia Webster “with conducing and (enticing) 
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away slaves from the possession & services of there masters and (overse-
ers).”296 Even when enslaved people “quite literally and obviously took their 
lives in their own hands,” as Wood writes,” they were “misrepresented as pas-
sive objects, ‘forced,’ ‘urged,’ ‘allowed,’ or ‘provoked’ to escape by various 
whites.” 297 This narrative manipulation is significant not only because it has 
had a lasting effect on historiography and national memory, but because this 
erasure of the way people resisted enslavement, which originated with slave-
holders, is but one step from the broader erasure of the history of their dispos-
session from a field like property law, as this article in the first instance aimed 
to address. 
CONCLUSION  
 The centuries-long effort to produce, maintain, and develop new forms of 
property in lands wrested from Native nations and people abducted from Africa 
and their descendants indelibly shaped the development of property law in the 
United States. By taking up the traditional topic of acquisition of property, and 
examining its three main theories—discovery, labor, and possession—I have 
shown that these theories played major roles in the history of acquisition in 
America. Further, they explain many aspects of the contemporary property law 
system, as well as its relation to the evolution of the theories, that a wholly con-
ceptual query into how “unowned things come to be owned” cannot. These as-
pects of property law include the basic elements of the land system that anchors 
the real estate system today, including the survey system, chains of title that all 
originate in Native title, the comprehensive title registry, and easy foreclosure 
of lands. Because these features of the land system construct the enclosure and 
produce its liquidity in the modern marketplace, they now constitute the pre-
scriptive features of a land regime in the process of propagation around the 
world that is heralded as the path to accessing the wealth of the global specula-
tive real estate market that rich nations enjoy.  
The history of property creation from which these structural innovations 
stem, allegorized by Locke as the labor theory, also took place in the context of 
a European contest to take possession of the lands, bodies, and resources of 
non-Europeans, and the goals and values of this project inform the techniques 
that it spawned. The way the fundamentally racial logic of the overarching pro-
jects of conquest and enslavement influenced this system’s development is in-
structive in several respects: it helps us to understand different dimensions of 
how racial logic works through law, in addition to giving us a fuller picture than 
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we have heretofore had of the costs and the dynamics of the system that arose 
here, as well as providing indications about the costs and dynamics that the 
model could exact in other contexts.  
The histories of conquest and enslavement show, for example, that the the 
principles of first-in-time, rewarding labor, and honoring possession were all 
selectively applied to the racial hierarchy of the Discovery project. While rela-
tively recent evolutions in the law of the United States have prohibited the se-
lective application of laws and distribution of rights according to racial hierar-
chy, this history enables us to see the close relation—parentage, perhaps-- 
between selective application of law and its selective enforcement according to 
this hierarchy, which is not subject to the same prohibitions. Further, the under-
lying necessity of dispossessing non-Europeans in order to establish European 
possession of property in both lands and people explains the powerful historical 
reliance of the construction of property value on this hierarchy of possession. In 
a manner memorialized by Locke and other colonial theorists in both coded and 
direct terms, without the dispossession of Native and Black people, there was 
no property in the first instance unless the lands and bodies were in the posses-
sions of whites. In an emerging society borne of this racial hierarchy, the pos-
session, presence, or proximity of non-white racial groups would correspond-
ingly lower the value of that property, in turns of the story that go beyond the 
scope of this article, to follow at a future time.  
Further, the massive project of dispossession that building a state on the 
premise of a market dominated by these two commodity categories had signifi-
cant implications for the way the state would organize and regulate the racial 
violence of property-making and protection. Above, I examined two examples 
of how the state relied on private violence to perform the labor of disposses-
sion, without exactly sanctioning or ordering it. As a result, private persons 
driven by self-interest organized collectively and powerfully to create and 
maintain property interests with racial violence, as well as to oppose that pro-
cess. The struggle between these private positions was a matter of life and 
death, future possibility and community survival, but expressed itself frequently 
in law as a matter of privileging property rights above the dignity of human life 
and the conditions necessary to sustain it. This ongoing conflict, which was so-
cial, intimate, and affective, as well legal, economic, and political, invested 
whites personally in the racial hierarchy that guided property production and 
non-whites in the defense of themselves and their homelands against it. As it 
produced new norms for a society permeated by racial conflict and the violence 
of dispossession, it also gave literal shape to the landscape of jurisdiction across 
the nation and the sovereignty and power of the United States.  
Finally, the norms established by this long history of violence were also 
epistemic. The profound investments that accrued over its course in communi-
ties and individuals have expressed themselves, in ways that we are just begin-
ning to map, in wholly different understandings of history and very specific ap-
proaches to teaching law, interpreting its basic principles, conceptualizing its 
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fields, that remain couched in broader habits of understanding the world. This 
article began by tracing the history of erasure in the field of property law in or-
der to open an inquiry into what we believe we know about a subject and why 
we think we know it. The history of knowledge production, like the history of 
law-making, nation-building, and property production in the United States, is 
characterized by much path dependence, as well as many instances at which 
people made decisive choices and countenanced great risk. This article offers 
one account of institutions, dynamics, and patterns we might better understand 
from a more complete account of where they came from, their historical effects, 
costs, functions, and failures. At a time when the instability and violence that 
has grown out of the histories explored here are rising, accounts of law and le-
gal institutions that have erased these histories cannot hope to help account for 
them or address the consequences they have wrought.  
 
